9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
647.
In the plan,
officials recognised that the UK authorities could not achieve
those
things
without active support from the Iraqi authorities in Basra and
Baghdad:
“The
announcement of our planned withdrawal from MNF sites in the city
centre has
created a
more favourable political environment in which to pursue this
objective
by showing
that we are serious about transition. Early transition to PIC is
important
to some
influential local leaders, who may be more willing than before to
give
rhetorical
support to our transfer conditions. We also need support form the
Central
Government.
Maliki’s attention is currently focused on the Baghdad Security
Plan.
Engaging
him on Basra will be difficult, but must be our
objective.”
648.
On security,
the Plan said:
“Our
military actions should aim to create the conditions in which local
politicians feel
able to
engage constructively to address Basra’s problems. Our aim is to
reduce the
threat from
illegal armed groups and Iranian proxies and to build the capacity
of the
Iraqi Army
to take on militant JAM …
“Operation
SINBAD has put MND(SE) on the front foot and served to
kickstart
the process
of transition. One of the major benefits of this operation has been
the
experience
it has given the local units of the Iraqi Army in planning and
carrying out
joint
operations alongside the Iraqi police and coalition forces
…”
“We will
reduce the threat from illegal armed groups by putting an
increased
emphasis on
operations against militant JAM, death squad leaders and
Iranian
proxies.
MND(SE) will maintain a heightened tempo of targeted strike
operations
and conduct
more joint operations with the ISF (including Iraqi Special Forces)
in
order to
neutralise irreconcilables and death squads, and deliver the
message that
we cannot
be bombed out of Basra.”
650.
The Plan
listed objectives for policing, the judiciary and prisons (which
are
covered in
Section 12.1), for infrastructure, governance and economic
development
(see Section
10.2) and for strategic communications, which aimed to “get Iraqis
to
deliver key
messages on our behalf”.
651.
On 3 March,
Iraqi Special Forces, supported by MNF‑I troops, carried out a raid
on
the Iraqi
Police‑run National Intelligence and Investigation Agency (NIIA) in
Basra.338
652.
The target was
not the NIIA but a death squad leader, whom it was
believed
was present
at the time.339
A number of
prisoners discovered during the operation
“inexplicably
escaped”.
338
eGram
9049/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 6 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Prime Minister Maliki,
5
March’.
339
Submission
Brind to Casey and PS/Howells, 7 March 2007, ‘Iraq: DOP(I), 8
March’ attaching
Speaking
Note.
121