5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
resolution
in all circumstances had made it impossible to achieve a new …
resolution”.
France,
with Russia in support, “were not prepared to accept” that if
Saddam Hussein
“did not
comply with the United Nations obligations, military action should
follow”.
The UK
was in a situation it had “striven to avoid”: “There would be no
second
resolution and
military action was likely to be necessary … to enforce
compliance
by Saddam
Hussein with Iraq’s obligations.”
828.
Mr Blair
stated that the US “had now undertaken to produce a ‘Road Map’ for
the
Middle East
Peace Process, once the new Palestinian Prime Minister’s
appointment
had been
confirmed”. That would “open the way to a full and final settlement
within
three
years”. The US “had also confirmed” that it “would seek a UN
mandate for the
post-conflict
reconstruction of Iraq”, and that: “Oil revenues would be
administered under
the UN’s
authority.”
“A lot of
work was needed to repair the strains which had arisen
internationally over
the past
few weeks. He regretted that the international community had sent
mixed
messages to
Saddam Hussein, whose regime could have been disarmed
peacefully
if
confronted by international solidarity. The blockage we had
encountered in the
United
Nations impeded any progress.”
830.
Mr Straw
said that Mr Blair:
“… had
persuaded President Bush … to go down the United Nations route in
order
to achieve
the maximum authority for the disarmament of Iraq, but the
diplomatic
process was
now at an end.”
“Progress
had been made towards forging a consensus before the French
and
Russians
had indicated their intention to veto any Security Council
resolution
proposed
which indicated that military action would follow Saddam Hussein’s
failure
to comply.
His assessment was that President Chirac of France had decided to
open
up a
strategic divide between France and the United Kingdom; the row in
Brussels
in late
2002 had been manufactured. Effectively, one member of the
Security
Council had
torpedoed the whole process.”
“… the one
chance now remaining to Saddam Hussein was to seek exile. If
that
course
failed, the Government would seek the support of the House of
Commons
for
military action against Iraq. There would be a substantive motion
in a debate now
scheduled
for Tuesday [18 March].”
833.
Lord Goldsmith
told Cabinet that he had answered a Parliamentary Question
in
the House
of Lords that day “on the authority for the use of force against
Iraq”; and
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