The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
367.
Mr Powell told
the Inquiry that the meeting with Vice President Cheney
constituted
the first
“face to face” discussions with the US.133
Mr Cheney
wanted to discuss Iraq with
Mr Blair
before he consulted Middle East leaders about what should be done
in Iraq and
“their
tolerance … for action”.
368.
Mr Powell
explained Mr Blair’s warning about “the law of
unintended
consequences”
as: “If you are going to deal with something like Iraq, you have to
think
ahead about
what might happen … including things you do not expect.” Mr Cheney
had
said “that
a coalition was nice, but not essential”.
369.
Sir David
Manning told the Inquiry that he didn’t think that Mr Cheney’s
message
had been a
“particular surprise”, and:
“… when the
Prime Minister says you have got to have a clever plan … I think he
is
probably
saying that you have got to go back through the UN system … he’s
clear
in his own
mind that it’s very important to try to keep the international
community
370.
Sir David
added that there was a difference between Mr Blair saying Iraq
would be
better off
without Saddam Hussein and:
“… saying
that he’s sympathetic to the idea that regime change is the purpose
of the
activity.
He always made it clear there had to be disarmament. That was what
we
were
looking for …
“So I think
it would be a mistake to assume that this conversation means the
Prime
Minister
has signed up [to an invasion] …” 135
371.
During a
visit to Washington on 12/13 March, Sir David Manning
reiterated
the
position Mr Blair had taken in his discussion with Vice President
Cheney that
the UK
“would continue to give strong support to the idea of regime
change” in
Iraq, but a
convincing plan would be needed.
372.
Sir David
Manning and Dr Rice’s discussions were focused on how
to
achieve
legitimacy and international support if the US decided to take
military
action to
secure the removal of Saddam Hussein. Sir David and Dr Rice did
not
discuss the
objectives of US and UK policy.
373.
Sir David
set out a list of concerns that would need to be addressed if
the
US wanted
allies to participate in military action.
133
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 18. The transcript incorrectly
records the date of the meeting
as 1
March.
134
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 26.
135
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 27-28.
452