10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

525.  Baroness Amos appeared before the International Development Committee (IDC)

on 30 June.286 Mr Tony Worthington invited Baroness Amos to clarify the Government’s

“aspirations” in Iraq, including “about having a sort of British zone”, enabled by some

devolution of powers from CPA(Baghdad). Baroness Amos replied:

“… we see the South very much as a European zone … rather than just a British

zone. The Italians are coming in soon. There is a Dane [Ambassador Olsen] who

is running CPA(South) … The Coalition effort is now very broad.”

526.  Baroness Amos sent a fuller report of her visit to Iraq to Mr Blair on 2 July.287 In

her covering letter, she advised that security was the “overwhelming – and immediate –

priority”. The UN planned to scale back the number of international UN staff in Baghdad,

from 300 to 200, on security grounds. Baroness Amos commented:

“This will send an extremely negative signal to both Iraqis and the international

community and – if it takes effect for more than a few weeks – it will also have a

major impact on our recovery and reconstruction effort … We should look again

at the number of troops in theatre and be prepared to put more Coalition (or other

international) troops on the ground if that is required.”

527.  Baroness Amos stated that the UK’s focus on security in the South (leaving

security in Baghdad largely to the US) was not good enough. Security across Iraq was

the single most important factor in determining the success or failure of political and

reconstruction efforts. The Coalition was running out of time.

528.  Baroness Amos highlighted three priorities from her report:

• security;

• agreeing a clear timetable for political transition and communicating it to the Iraqi

people; and

• “urgent actions to effect palpable, significant and immediate improvements in the

lives of the Iraqi people”.

529.  Baroness Amos concluded by asking that Mr Blair raise two issues with President

Bush when they spoke the following day:

• the urgent need to grip security in Baghdad; and

• the need for a public and well-communicated timetable for the political transition.

530.  Baroness Amos’s report stated that, in many respects, life in Basra and Baghdad

was “returning to normal”. In Basra, water and sanitation services were back at

pre‑conflict levels, a possible cholera epidemic had been contained, the public health

286  International Development Committee, Session 2002-2003, Examination of Witnesses

(Questions 60-77), 30 June 2003.

287  Letter Amos to Blair, 2 July 2003, [untitled], attaching Report, [undated], ‘Iraq: Visit Report’.

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