The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
258.
Sir David
Manning submitted the letter to Mr Blair, commenting: “To be
aware that
Jeremy
G[reenstock] is in debate with the AG.”97
259.
A copy of Sir
Jeremy’s letter was sent only to Lord Goldsmith’s
office.
260.
In a minute to
Lord Goldsmith on 24 January, Ms Adams addressed the
points
made by Sir
Jeremy on the textual arguments; the history of the negotiations;
the
precedent
provided by resolution 1205 (1998); and references that had been
made by
Sir Jeremy
to a paper submitted by Professor Christopher Greenwood Q.C.,
Professor
of
International Law, LSE, to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) in
October 2002.98
“Overall,
although I don’t believe that the arguments can all be taken
without
challenge,
I certainly think they strengthen the case for the second view and
make
the balance
of view as to which is the better of the two alternative
interpretations
rather
closer.”
262.
Ms Adams
suggested that Lord Goldsmith “might want to consider” whether
he
“would like
to put these arguments to Michael Wood”. Although that would
“probably
mean
disclosing to him your provisional view of the resolution and
perhaps even the
draft
advice”.
263.
Ms Adams
commented to Lord Goldsmith that Sir Jeremy’s letter to Sir
David
Manning
“helpfully sets out his view of the arguments, although I don’t
think there are
any points
which are not covered in my minute of 24 January”.99
264.
Lord
Goldsmith’s undated minute to Ms Adams, inviting her to draft a
note setting
out his
views, suggested that he did not share Sir Jeremy’s view that the
wording of OP4
was the
“central issue”.100
265.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that Sir Jeremy’s main argument had been that there
was
“no need to
focus on the words ‘for assessment’ in OP4 because there is a
trigger in
OP1
suspended by OP2 but which suspension will be lifted if Iraq ‘fails
to take the final
opportunity’”.
266.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that he did “not consider that this argument can in fact
work
to create a
form of automaticity if the final opportunity is not taken”. He
focused on
the fact
that OPs 4 and 11 both led to OP12 and the need for the Security
Council to
meet “to
consider the situation … and the need for full compliance with all
the relevant
97
Manuscript
comment Manning to PM, 25 January 2003, on Letter Greenstock to
Manning, 24 January
2003,
[untitled].
98
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution 1441:
Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s
points’.
99
Manuscript
comment Adams to AG, 27 January 2003, on Letter Greenstock to
Manning, 24 January
2003,
[untitled].
100
Minute
Attorney General to Adams, [24 January 2003],
[untitled].
52