10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
635.
Concern over
the apparent failure of the CPA’s plans to restore electricity
prompted
Mr Richmond
to commission Mr Nick Horne, a UK consultant working in the
CPA, to
produce a
report on electricity supply problems in the Basra
area.352
636.
Mr Horne’s
report identified the immediate causes of the blackout across the
Basra
area on 9
August, and made recommendations to address them.353
It also
identified the
medium- and
long-term measures required to accelerate restoration of a reliable
supply
of
electricity across Iraq.
637.
Mr Richmond
sent copies of the report to the FCO, the MOD, DFID, the DTI
and
the Cabinet
Office on 20 August.354
He
commented:
“Iraq’s
electricity infrastructure suffered decades of neglect. Though
little damaged
by the war,
subsequent looting and sabotage have caused massive damage
to
transmission
lines. This goes some way to explain why electricity supplies
have
been so
unreliable. But Coalition plans to restore power to pre-war levels
were
not
properly staffed, funded or implemented. Two or three months have
been
largely
wasted.”
638.
Mr Richmond
reported that the CPA’s electricity team was small (eight
people,
of whom
only three were specialists) and poorly managed. In contrast, a UN
project in
northern
Iraq employed 80 international experts and several thousand Iraqis
to run a
small
network that relied on a single hydro-electric power
station.
639.
The CPA had
been working to a plan to achieve pre-war levels of
generation
(4,400MW)
by the end of September. That plan comprised “a single sheet [of
paper]
with no
activities, timescales, parts requirements etc”.
640.
Mr Richmond
suggested that the riots in Basra had drawn attention to
the
CPA’s
failure to meet electricity targets. Ambassador Bremer had been
“horrified” by
Mr Horne’s
report and had directed that a “proper plan” should be developed. A
revised
plan to
generate 4,400MW by the end of September had now been agreed; a
plan to
generate
6,000MW (Iraq’s estimated need) by May 2004 was being
developed.
641.
Mr Richmond
recommended that the UK should support this effort by
providing
technical
experts in a number of areas.
642.
Mr Richmond
also reported that a major conference would take place
at
CENTCOM
Headquarters at the end of August to discuss electricity and
oil.
643.
On 19 August,
the UN Headquarters at the Canal Hotel, Baghdad, was
bombed;
22 UN staff
and visitors including Mr Vieira de Mello were killed (see
Section 9.2).
352
Telegram
128 IraqRep to FCO London, 20 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Electricity: What
Went Wrong and
What is
Being Done’.
353
Report
Horne, 12 August 2003, ‘Report on the Electrical Problems in the
Basrah Area’.
354
Telegram
128 IraqRep to FCO London, 20 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Electricity: What
Went Wrong and
What is
Being Done’.
111