9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

• Protecting critical electoral infrastructure. Plans were in hand, but success could

not be guaranteed. Although the IECI were in the lead on this, it was possible

that the MNF-I would be asked for logistical support, which in Lt Gen Fry’s view

could undermine the legitimacy of the elections.

384. On 14 December, Mr Blair commented to President Bush that:

“The good news from Fallujah was that it had not prompted a serious escalation

elsewhere. But, equally it had not ended the insurgency.” 203

385. Mr Asquith commented after visiting Iraq that the after-effects of Fallujah would:

“… persist beyond the elections as the scale of destruction becomes apparent

to returning families and the wider public. Restoring more than very basic services

will take months. The insurgents are returning and the MNF/IIG relationship

is fractious.”204

386. Meanwhile, Mr Asquith reported that some considered the problems in Mosul

would trigger a “grim conflict that will dwarf Fallujah”.

387. Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely told the Inquiry that the main lesson from Fallujah was

“don’t allow a safe haven to take effect in an insurgency situation”.205

388. The deadline for both voters and political parties/candidates to register for the

election was 15 December.206

389. In a briefing paper on 15 December, the IPU estimated that voter registration had

been successful around the country with the exception of Anbar and, to a lesser extent,

Ninawa provinces (both Sunni). Opinion polls over recent months had suggested that

there was broad support for elections on time and a desire to vote, including among the

Sunni community.

390. Over 200 political entities (party lists and independent candidates) had registered

and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq had certified over 470 candidate

lists (totalling more than 11,000 candidates). The majority of these were for the

18 provincial elections, with 11 for the Kurdish National Assembly and just over

70 for elections to the TNA.

391. A briefing paper for Mr Blair to use at the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq on

16 December recommended that Ministers should focus on whether HMG had done

everything possible to create the best possible conditions for the elections by:

• pushing hard on Sunni outreach;

203 Letter Phillipson to Adams, 14 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush,

14 December: Iraq and the MEPP’.

204 Minute Asquith to Owen, 20 December 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq, 13-17 December’.

205 Public hearing, 14 December 2009, page 27.

206 Briefing IPU, 15 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Mini-Ministerial on Iraq, 16 December’.

457