3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
disarmament
of Iraq “and thereby the maintenance of the authority of
the
United Nations”.
829.
Mr Straw
stated that Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer “set out the
legal
basis for
the use of force”.
830.
Mr Straw
drew attention to the significance of the fact that no one
“in
discussions
in the Security Council and outside” had claimed that Iraq was
in
full compliance
with its obligations.
831.
Mr Straw
made a statement to the House of Commons at 8.24pm.292
832.
Referring to
the statement issued at the Azores Summit calling on all
members
of the
Security Council to adopt a resolution challenging Saddam Hussein
to take
a strategic
decision to disarm, Mr Straw told the House of
Commons:
“Such a
resolution has never been needed legally, but we have long
had
a preference
for it politically.”
833.
Mr Straw
stated that there had been “intense diplomatic activity to secure
that
end over
many months, culminating in the last 24 hours”. Despite “final
efforts” by Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock the previous evening and his own conversations with his
“Spanish,
American,
Russian and Chinese counterparts that morning”, the Government
had:
“…
reluctantly concluded that a Security Council consensus on a new
resolution
would not
be possible. On my instructions, Sir Jeremy Greenstock made a
public
announcement
to that effect at the United Nations at about 3.15pm UK time
today.”
834.
Mr Straw
continued that, since the adoption of resolution 1441 in
November
2002, he,
Mr Blair and Sir Jeremy Greenstock had “strained every nerve”
in search of
a consensus
“which could finally persuade Iraq by peaceful means, to provide
the full
and
immediate co-operation demanded by the Security
Council”.
835.
Mr Straw
stated that it was significant that “in all the discussions in the
Security
Council and
outside” no-one had claimed that Iraq was “in full compliance with
the
obligations
placed on it”; and:
“Given
that, it was my belief, up to about a week ago, that we were close
to
achieving a
consensus that we sought on the further resolution. Sadly, one
country
then
ensured that the Security Council could not act. President Chirac’s
unequivocal
announcement
last Monday that France would veto a second resolution
containing
that or any
ultimatum ‘whatever the circumstances’ inevitably created a sense
of
paralysis
in our negotiations. I deeply regret that France has thereby put a
Security
Council
consensus beyond reach.”
292
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, columns 703-705.
545