9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
{{reconstruction
programmes which deliver jobs and improvements to
infrastructure
and services; and
{{reduction of
subsidies and an agreed IMF programme leading to a
debt
settlement
by the end of the year.
24.
The paper said
that security problems posed the greatest risk to achieving
the
objectives
it set out, in particular the risk of “a terrorist spectacular”
against either the
IIG or the
UN. Other significant risks included postponement of the elections,
pressure
for
premature withdrawal of the MNF-I, infrastructure failures during
the summer and
an increase
in sectarian tension.
25.
Based on the
objectives and risks listed, the UK priorities proposed
were:
•
redefining
the US and UK relationship with the IIG, so that it would be seen
to
be taking
decisions without interference;
•
persuading
the UN to increase its engagement;
•
pushing for
an international conference;
•
improving
electoral communications and getting the UK media to
reflect
“the improving
situation in Iraq”;
•
supporting
IIG efforts to re-engage members of the former regime and
keeping
pressure on
neighbouring states regarding border security;
•
mitigating
opposition to the MNF-I, including by countering perceptions
of
an intention
to stay indefinitely;
•
supporting
Iraqiisation of security forces;
•
keeping
pressure on the US to spend money in Southern Iraq;
and
•
pressing
the UN and World Bank to send staff back to Iraq.
26.
When DOP met
on 15 July it agreed those priorities and also that the UK
should
continue to
encourage potential contributors to a UN protection
force.14
27.
Some positive
progress on electricity production was reported, but
implementation
of the main
infrastructure contracts was slow. DOP agreed that DFID
should produce
a note
on infrastructure issues which Mr Blair might use in discussions
with
President Bush.
28.
In a paper for
the Chiefs of Staff dated 16 July, Lieutenant General Robert
Fry,
Deputy
Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments), stated that “although
insurgency
continues,
development of competent Iraqi Security Forces remains on
track.”15
29.
Provided the
necessary criteria were achieved, the campaign plan
envisaged
a gradual
drawdown of troops during 2005 leading to final withdrawal in 2006,
to be
followed by
a period of “Strategic Overwatch”.
14
Minutes, 15
July 2004, DOP meeting.
15
Minute
DCDS(C) to COS, 16 July 2004, ‘Strategic Intent’.
401