The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
697.
The Washington
Post article was
also reported by the UK media on 12 February,
including
by the BBC
under the
headline “Iraq ‘prompts CIA method change’”.389
698.
Ms Miscik’s
speech was released publicly by the CIA in March
2004.390
699.
On
17 February Mr Dowse sent SIS3 the draft of a speech on
WMD to be made
by
Mr Blair at some time in the next six to eight
weeks.391
It was
“very different from
the
version” they had been discussing. Mr Blair had reworked the
text himself over the
weekend and
it focused “much more [on] the justification for the war in
Iraq”.
700.
The No.10
briefing for Mr Blair’s video conference with President Bush
on
17 February
stated that the President’s speech on proliferation had not had the
impact
he seemed
to have expected.392
Mr Blair
should inform President Bush that he was
working on
his own speech “to produce a philosophical rationale for our action
on WMD
(and
terrorism)”.
701.
Mr Blair
told President Bush on 17 February that he wanted his own
speech to get
across the
linkages between WMD, rogue states and terrorism.393
Recent
investigations
were
uncovering further details of the AQ networks in the
UK.394
Mr Blair
added that,
in dealing
with WMD, it was impossible for the political leadership to err on
the side
of caution.
702.
Preparations
for the ISG Status Report began in late February.
703.
Mr Duelfer
made it clear to the UK that he would not accept “joint
drafting”.
704.
Mr Scarlett
sent to Mr Duelfer “nuggets” from the September 2003
ISG
Interim
Report that he considered might be relevant to the next ISG
report.
He assured
Mr Duelfer that these were not drafting
proposals.
705.
Mr Blair
stated that Mr Duelfer must be in charge of production of the
report,
but that it
must be handled better than the last.
706.
Mr Duelfer
set out his plans for the next ISG report during a video conference
on
24 February.395
The report,
later known as the ISG Status Report, would be no more
than 25-30
pages, avoid conclusions or assessments, identify the issues
remaining to
389
BBC
News,
12 February 2004, Iraq
prompts CIA method change.
390
Speech DDI,
11 February 2004, DDI’s State
of Analysis Speech.
391
Letter
Dowse to SIS3, 17 February 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech on
WMD’.
392
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 16 February 2004, ‘Video-Conference
with Bush, 17 February’.
393
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 17 February 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s
Video-Conference with President Bush,
17 February’.
394
The
Government has provided evidence indicating that the reference in
the record to “AQ networks
in the
UK” was an error. The record should have referred to the networks
of the Pakistani nuclear
proliferator
AQ Khan.
395
Minute
[DIS] to DCDI, 24 February 2004, ‘Iraq/ISG: Senior Level UK/US
VTC 24 February 2004’.
562