The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Maliki; a
real effort by him on reconciliation would enhance Iraq’s relations
with its
Sunni neighbours.
686.
Maj Gen Shaw
reported on 21 March: “The ripples of the raid on the NIIA
are
seemingly
spreading the further we get from the operation
itself.”364
687.
The Iraqi MOD
had issued a letter stating that joint operations between the
Iraqi
Army in
Basra and the MNF should cease (temporarily). Although this had
since been
rescinded,
Maj Gen Shaw commented that “this makes moving Basra forward
towards
PIC more
difficult”.
688.
On 21 March,
at the request of the Iraq Senior Officials Group, the JIC
examined
the
relative threat posed by AQ-I in Iraq compared with other Sunni
insurgent groups.365
689.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements were:
“I. Al
Qaida in Iraq (AQ‑I) is the single largest Sunni insurgent network
with the
greatest
geographical spread and influence. AQ‑I’s main effort is the
prosecution
of a
sectarian campaign designed to drag Iraq into civil war. Its
campaign had been
the most
effective of any insurgent group: it has had significant impact
over the past
year and
poses the greatest immediate threat to stability in
Iraq.
“II.
Sustained Multi‑National Force (MNF) pressure has prevented AQ‑I
from
establishing
unchallenged control across any significant part of Iraq. But it
has had
only
temporary impact on the level of their violence …”
690.
The JIC judged
that distinctions between “Sunni Arab nationalists” and
“jihadists”
were
increasingly artificial:
“Although
key AQ‑I leadership elements remain non‑Iraqi, the
organisation’s
membership
is overwhelmingly Iraqi and largely indistinguishable from the
wider
Sunni
insurgency. We judge many Sunni insurgents see common cause in
resisting
Shia
violence, the ‘occupation’ and, increasingly, what they see as a
hostile
Iranian‑backed
government.”
691.
The JIC added
in a footnote:
“The AQ
endorsed leader, Abu Ayyub al‑Masri, is Egyptian; the nominal
(and
possibly
fictitious) head of the Islamic State of Iraq is Abu Umar
al‑Baghdadi,
an Iraqi.”
“MNF have
identified more than 50 groups by name, but they have no
coherent
overall
leadership, only localised influence and no single dominant group
has
364
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 21 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq update – 21
March 2007’.
365
JIC
Assessment, 21 March 2007, ‘Iraq: How Important is Al Qaida in
Iraq’.
128