4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
SIS … has
thrown doubt on the reliability of one of the links in the
reporting chain
affecting
this intelligence report.”241
618.
The third
source about which doubts had arisen provided “the vast majority of
the
intelligence
suggesting that Iraq had developed mobile facilities for the
production of
biological
agent”.242
Sir Richard
Dearlove told the Butler Review in May 2004 that these
reports had
“been received through a liaison service” and SIS:
“… had been
able to verify that he had worked in an area which would have
meant
that he
would have had access to the sort of information he claimed to
have. But
they had
not been able to question him directly until after the
war.”
619.
SIS told the
Butler Review that, after their initial debrief of the source
(Curve Ball):
•
It had
“become apparent that significant detail did not appear in the
original
liaison
reports … But based on the information derived from the limited
access
to date we
continue to judge that it is premature to conclude … that all
the
intelligence
from the source must be discounted.”
•
SIS had
concluded that the trailers described by the source as part of the
mobile
facilities
would have produced agent in the form of a slurry, which would
have
a limited
life, and, therefore, that the “most likely function … was to
provide a
breakout
production capability and not the continued production of
material
for stockpiling”.
•
SIS was
continuing to debrief the source.243
620.
The Butler
Report concluded that the reports received in 2000 from this
source,
suggesting
that Iraq had recently produced biological agent were “seriously
flawed”; and
that the
grounds for the JIC Assessments drawing on these reports (see
Section 4.1) “no
621.
The Butler
Report stated that the source (Curve Ball) was “a refugee”, and
that his
reporting
had been:
“… treated
with some caution by the JIC until it appeared to be confirmed by
other
human
intelligence. The subsequent need to withdraw a key part of the
reporting
received
through the liaison service arose as a result of misunderstandings,
not
because of
the source’s status.”245
241
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
512.
242
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
406.
243
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
407-409.
244
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
409.
245
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
438.
397