13.1 |
Resources
•
Oil
revenues could pay for most of Iraq’s reconstruction – but only if
oil
production
levels and prices were favourable, Iraq did not have to repay
its
debts, and
the rehabilitation of Iraq’s oil infrastructure was
“cheap”.
291.
The draft
paper stated that sources of financing for relief and
reconstruction
remained
uncertain. Significant assistance from the international community
including
the IFIs
would be extremely unlikely without a UN mandate.
292.
A slightly
revised version of that paper was sent to Mr Boateng the
following day.175
293.
Mr Brown
also received advice from a Treasury official on the potential
impact of all
military
and non‑military expenditure in Iraq on public
expenditure.176
The
official’s advice
on military
expenditure is described earlier in this Section.
294.
The official
advised that it remained difficult to assess the scale of the
humanitarian
and
reconstruction response that would be needed. However, based on a
“typical”
UK
contribution of 10 percent of total aid, the UK might spend up to
£1.35bn on
humanitarian
assistance and reconstruction in the two years after a
conflict.
295.
The official
concluded:
“DFID have
yet to make any formal approach to us on these costs but,
if
you’re
minded to,
the [6 March Ministerial] meeting might be a good opportunity
to
dampen
their expectations.
“… we have
said that departments should meet new costs through
re‑prioritisation.
It is not
clear though how long this position will hold.”
296.
The IPU
prepared an annotated agenda for the meeting, in consultation with
other
297.
With the
invasion possibly only weeks away, the IPU stated that US and
UK
planning
assumed that, in the “medium term after the conflict”, Coalition
Forces would
be
“re‑deployed into six or seven geographical sectors in order to
provide a secure
environment
for the civil transitional administration to conduct humanitarian
assistance
and
reconstruction work”. The US expected the UK Division in Iraq to be
responsible for
a
geographical sector. That would be “very expensive and could have
wider resource
implications”.
The IPU concluded that: “Ministers need urgently to take a view on
this
before the
military planning assumptions become a fait accompli.”
175
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 5 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Letter from Clare Short on
Humanitarian
Planning’ attaching Paper DFID [draft], March 2003, ‘Iraq Relief
and Reconstruction Costs:
an
Overview’.
176
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq –
Potential Public Spending Impact’.
177
Paper IPU,
5 March 2003, ‘Planning for the UK’s Role in Iraq after
Saddam’.
491