9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
228.
In a telephone
conversation on 15 October, Mr Blair was reported to have said
to
President
Bush that “we had to deal with Fallujah. But it was important that
Allawi had
the
politics right before action was taken.”115
229.
Mr Blair told
President Bush that the UK “would try to help” in North
Babil.
230.
On 15 October,
in a round up of political events in Iraq, Mr Chaplin reported
an
increase in
political activity to the FCO in London, observing that parties had
“shifted
up a
gear as they realised that the clock was ticking”.116
231.
As well as the
established political parties, Mr Chaplin wrote that:
“… more
than 300 parties and movements have been formed since the fall
of
Saddam and
there is a growing realisation among the smaller parties that they
need
to
consolidate to gain seats.”
232.
Mr Chaplin
reported that Prime Minister Allawi:
“… has been
making all the right noises about the elections being open to
everyone,
and
emphasising that the prospects for the residents of places like
Fallujah, Mosul,
and Sadr
city would be much better if there was political dialogue and
participation
in the
electoral process.”
233.
On 17 October,
a statement appeared on an Islamist website containing
a
personal pledge
of allegiance to Usama Bin Laden by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi.117
234.
Shortly
afterwards, the name of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organisation changed
to
“Base of
Jihad (ie Al Qaida) in The Land of The Two Rivers”.118
It was
normally referred
to in UK
documents as Al Qaida in Iraq (AQ-I).
235.
In a report to
Gen Walker and ACM Torpy on 17 October, Lt Gen McColl called
for
“an early
and unambiguous decision in principle for the deployment [to North
Babil] to
proceed,
allowing the necessary battle procedure and preparation to start as
soon as
236.
The same
report covered planning for the US force posture in Iraq. Lt Gen
McColl
reported
that US discussions had concluded with the decision “not to pursue
the
possibility
of making an early announcement of intention to
withdraw”.
237.
Mr Hoon made a
statement in the House of Commons on 18 October in
response
to
“considerable speculation in the media … about the United Kingdom
deploying forces
115
Letter
Quarrey to Adams, 15 October 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone
Conversation with President Bush,
15 October:
US Politics, Iraq and Iran’.
116
Telegram
286 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Internal:
Political Round-up
9-15
October’.
117
BBC
News, 18
October 2004, Zarqawi
‘shows Bin Laden loyalty’.
118
JIC
Assessment, 11 November 2004, ‘Iraq Security – Current
Concerns’.
119
Minute
McColl to CDS & CJO, 17 October 2004, ‘Report 133 of 17 Oct
04’.
433