The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

be set out in the “vision for Iraq and other public messages (likely to be held back until

we are … actually at war: until then we would not wish to be seen to be actively pursuing

regime change …)”.

1002.  On the principles, Mr Cannon stated:

“The principles are those which should guide our occupation, if only short-term, of

Iraqi territory. They are pretty uncontroversial. But our military commanders would

find this sort of guidance, endorsed by Ministers, very useful.”

1003.  Mr Cannon concluded:

“If you approve these objectives and principles, the next step would be for Iraq

Planning Unit to share them with the Americans. There is no reason to think that

they cut across American views in any way.”

1004.  The evidence seen by the Inquiry indicates that Mr Blair saw Mr Cannon’s minute,

but not whether he approved the draft objectives and principles.429

1005.  There is no indication that Mr Blair discussed the objectives and principles with

Ministers.

1006.  Mr Bowen sent a revised draft set of ‘British Post-Conflict Objectives’ to senior

officials in the FCO, the MOD and DFID on 25 March, six days after the start of the

invasion.

1007.  The first Treasury paper on financing post-conflict reconstruction to be

shared with No.10 recommended spreading the burden as widely as possible.

1008.  If the UN was not involved, the resources available would be substantially

smaller and the IMF and World Bank would be unlikely to engage.

1009.  On 14 March, Mr Bowman sent No.10 the paper on financing Iraqi reconstruction

requested by Mr Blair on 6 March.430

1010.  The paper was the first Treasury paper on post-conflict financing to be shared

with No.10.

1011.  The Treasury estimated the total cost at up to US$45bn for the first three years,

in addition to military costs, and warned that, without UN authorisation of arrangements

for a transitional administration, Iraqi oil might only pay for a fraction of the total.

1012.  The best way to pay for reconstruction would be to spread the burden as widely

as possible, drawing in contributions from non-combatants, IFIs and Iraq itself, and

429 Manuscript note [tick] on Minute Cannon to Prime Minister, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: post-conflict planning:

objectives and principles’.

430 Letter Bowman to Cannon, 14 March 2003, [untitled] attaching Paper HM Treasury, March 2003,

‘Financing Iraqi Reconstruction’.

492