The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

control over key economic facilities and points in Basra by particular parties of

political forces, whether it was JAM or Fadhila.”132

276. Mr Blair considered the separate pieces of advice from Sir Nigel Sheinwald and

Mr Powell on the implications of the US Red Team Report; the FCO/MOD/DFID advice

on the implications of the Jameat incident; and the 28 September JIC Assessment over

the weekend of 1 and 2 October.133

277. In a note to No.10 staff dated 2 October, Mr Blair said that essentially he agreed

with Sir Nigel’s advice, but he did not consider that the Red Team was advocating a

different strategy, just a means of implementing the existing one.134 Mr Blair wrote:

“We do need to have a posture of wanting to withdraw; but when the job is done. We

should be able, on either case, to get some troops withdrawn next year but right now

I don’t think that is the key. The key is effective implementation.”

278. In Mr Blair’s view, the insurgency had to be presented “clearly and plainly” as an

obstacle to, not the pretext for, withdrawal. He added:

“The ‘ink-spot’ strategy is right. It isn’t what we’ve done so far … This needs to be

articulated, planned and followed through.”

279. Mr Blair also supported “behind-the-scenes” help for Mr Allawi, reaching out to the

Sadrists to bring them “into some sort of understanding”, and emphasised that “we are

totally underestimating the degree to which the present problems are the product of bad

government”.

280. On the police, Mr Blair commented: “We need someone put in charge of sorting

out this mess.” He supported the recommendation to strengthen the UK’s co-ordinating

machinery at Ministerial level, proposing that he would chair fortnightly meetings.

281. Mr Blair wrote:

“I also favour giving JR [Reid] the lead as much as possible. We should split it up.

JR on security, Iraqiisation and to be out there defending the case. JS [Straw] on

political outreach.”

282. Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by video conference on 3 October.135

132 Private hearing, 2010, pages 54-58.

133 Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq update’.

134 Note TB [Blair], 2 October 2005, ‘Note’.

135 Letter Quarrey to Siddiq, 3 October 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush:

Middle East issues’.

536