The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
559.
The record of
the first AHGI meeting stated that work should remain “as
internal
thinking
within departments” for the next few weeks.320
560.
The AHGI
remained the principal Whitehall co-ordination mechanism
for
non‑military
Iraq planning until the creation of the inter-departmental Iraq
Planning Unit
(IPU) in
February 2003.
561.
The AHGI did
not commission or receive any papers relating to UK
commercial
interests
in a post-conflict Iraq during its operation.
562.
On 12
September 2002, Sir David Manning, the Head of OD Sec and
Mr Blair’s
Foreign
Policy Adviser, commissioned a paper from the FCO setting out what
a post-
Saddam
Government might look like.321
563.
The FCO sent
its paper on post-Saddam government in Iraq, entitled
‘Scenarios
for the
future of Iraq after Saddam’, to Sir David on 26
September.322
It was
circulated
separately
to the AHGI.
564.
The paper
stated that to influence developments on Iraq, the UK needed
“the
clearest
possible sense of our objectives for Iraq”. The UK’s “fundamental
interest
in a stable
region providing secure supplies of oil to world markets” suggested
four
overarching
priorities:
•
termination
of Iraq’s WMD programme and permanent removal of the
threat
it posed;
•
a more
inclusive and effective Iraqi Government;
•
a viable
Iraq which was not a threat to its neighbours; and
•
an end to
Iraqi support for international terrorism.
565.
The UK also
had a number of “second order” objectives, including ensuring
that
British
companies benefitted from any post-war reconstruction
contracts.
566.
Sir Christopher
Meyer, British Ambassador to the US, responded to the
paper
by
questioning whether it was right to classify securing
reconstruction contracts as a
second
order objective.323
Russia and
France were, by all accounts, anxious about their
economic
interests in Iraq after Saddam Hussein. UK interests were not
something to
press
immediately, but should be a “top priority” in post-Saddam
contingency planning.
Mr Blair
would have to pursue the issue with President Bush if the UK were
to have
any impact.
320
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 23 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on
Iraq’.
321
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
322
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 26 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the future
of Iraq after Saddam’
attaching
Paper FCO, [undated], ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after
Saddam’.
323
Telegram
1256 Washington to FCO London, 1 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Dividing the
Spoils’.
458