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3.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford
614.  Secondly:
“… we must be prepared to act where terrorism or weapons of mass destruction
threaten us. The fight against international terrorism is right. We should pursue it
vigorously. Not just in Afghanistan but elsewhere. Not just by military means but by
disrupting the finances of terrorism … But there should be no let up.
“If necessary the action should be military and again, if necessary and justified, it
should involve regime change. I have been involved … in three conflicts involving
regime change …
“Britain is immensely proud of the part our forces have played and with the results
but I can honestly say that the people most pleased have been the people living
under the regime in question …
“We cannot, of course, intervene in all cases but where countries are engaged in
the terror or the WMD business, we should not shirk from confronting them. Some
can be offered a way out, a route to respectability. I hope in time that Syria, Iran
and even North Korea … A new relationship is on offer. But they must know that
sponsoring terrorism or WMD is not acceptable.
“As for Iraq, I know that some fear precipitate action. They needn’t. We will proceed
as we did after September 11, in a calm, measured, sensible but firm way. But
leaving Iraq to develop WMD, in flagrant breach of no less than nine separate UN
Security Council resolutions, refusing still to allow weapons inspectors back to do
their work properly, is not an option. The regime of Saddam is detestable. Brutal,
repressive, political opponents routinely tortured and executed: it is a regime without
a qualm in sacrificing the lives of its citizens to preserve itself, or starting wars with
neighbouring states and it has used chemical weapons against its own people.
“As I say, the moment for decision on how to act is not yet with us. But to allow
weapons of mass destruction to be developed by a state like Iraq without let or
hindrance would be grossly to ignore the lessons of September 11 and we will not
do it. The message to Saddam is clear: he has to let the inspectors back in, anyone,
any time, any place that the international community demands.”
615.  Thirdly, quoting the plight of the Middle East, the dispute between India and
Pakistan and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Angola, Mr Blair
stated:
“… we should work hard to broker peace where conflict threatens a region’s stability
because we know the dangers of contagion …”
616.  Fourthly, Mr Blair argued:
“Prevention is better than cure. The reason it would be crazy for us to clear out of
Afghanistan once we had finished militarily, is that if it drifts back into instability, the
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