9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
seriously
disrupted by Coalition strikes, although it is likely that remnants
of the
network
could try to re-group in Northern Iraq and attempt attacks against
Coalition
interests …
And in mid to late April, terrorists continued to be active in
Baghdad. We
have no
intelligence on the specific intent of these terrorists, but judge
that they
will
remain in
place, and attempt attacks against Western
interests.”
230.
Hard
Lessons, the US
Government’s account of reconstruction in Iraq, records
that
Gen Garner
and his senior ORHA staff deployed to Baghdad on 21
April.123
When
they
arrived:
“Outside
the gates of the Republican Palace where ORHA was trying to set up
shop,
anarchy
reigned … Many government buildings had been
destroyed.
…
“The
looting quickly changed into organized theft by gangs of Iraqi
criminals and
insurgents
trying to destabilize the country.”
231.
In late April,
the UK Area of Operations was declared “permissive”, first by
UK
forces on
22 April,124
and a few
days later by the United Nations Security
Co-ordinator.125
232.
The Coalition
defined “permissive” environments as ones to which
humanitarian
assistance
organisations could have access but should use all precautionary
measures
and notify
the Coalition Forces.126
233.
Drawdown of UK
troops in fact had begun before South-East Iraq was
formally
declared
“permissive”.
234.
The UK
maritime and air presence had begun to reduce by 9
April.127
235.
Mr Hoon
advised Parliament on 11 April that:
“As the
pattern of Coalition operations in Iraq changes, it will be
possible for a
number of
units to proceed with other tasking or return to the United
Kingdom.” 128
236.
Mr Hoon
described the planned withdrawal of air and maritime assets, and
said:
“It is our
policy to deploy personnel on operations for no longer than is
necessary
to achieve
our military objectives. We will therefore continue to adjust our
forces
123
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.
U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2009.
124
Note
[unattributed], 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10
Sitrep – As at 0630 on
23 April 2003’.
125
Written
evidence to the Select Committee on Defence, 16 March 2004,
‘Further Memorandum from
the Ministry
of Defence on post conflict issues’, February 2004’, HC
57-III.
126
Report of
The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in
Iraq, 20
October 2003.
127
Report
Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation TELIC Hauldown Report:
07 Feb 03 –
08 May 03’.
128
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 11 April
2003, columns 38-39WS.
169