9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
603.
Dr Reid told
the House:
“That
reflects the completion of our security sector reform tasks to
develop the
capability
of the Iraqi forces, including training the trainers and those
involved in
guarding
their own institutions. The reduction also reflects improvements in
the way
we
configure our own forces.”
604.
In relation to
the al-Askari bombing, Dr Reid said:
“Some
commentators have suggested that that act of terror will lead to a
slide into
civil war.
Those acts of terrorism are cruel and barbaric but they are not
mindless.
They have a
purpose: to undermine the efforts of the vast majority of the Iraqi
people
who seek
peace, stability and democracy in their country, and to try to
break the will
of the
coalition forces supporting them in that quest.
“… Our
analysis is that civil war is neither imminent nor inevitable.
However, in some
areas of
Iraq, including Baghdad, there has been an increase in sectarian
violence.”
605.
On 13 March,
Mr Asquith updated the Iraq Strategy Group on the
latest
developments
in forming an Iraqi government.294
The meeting
of the Council of
Representatives
planned for 12 March had been delayed by a week and it
remained
uncertain
who would be Prime Minister.
606.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald observed that:
“In our
messages to the Iraqis, we should be clear about the political
difficulties the
continuing
political vacuum was causing the US and UK. We should also press
for
Condoleezza
Rice to visit Iraq to inject momentum into the
process.”
607.
Lt Gen Fry,
who had taken up post as SBMR-I on 9 March, told the Iraq
Strategy
Group that
Iraq was not yet in a state of civil war and that although there
were real risks,
“a
significant event” would be required to tip the balance. US Central
Command’s view
was that
“Iraq was still some way off being in an irrecoverable
position”.
608.
On 15 March,
at the request of the FCO and the MOD, the JIC assessed
the
security
situation in southern Iraq.295
609.
The JIC judged
that:
“I. Levels
of violence in southern Iraq are much lower than in Baghdad and
Sunni
areas in
the centre and north …
“II. The
greatest potential for widespread violence lies in tensions between
SCIRI’s
Badr
organisation and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia
…
294
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 13 March 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group’.
295
JIC
Assessment, 15 March 2006, ‘Iraq: the Security Situation in the
South’.
589