The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
416.
In preparation
for the meeting on 23 July, Mr Bowen advised Mr Hoon that
the
meeting
would discuss the Cabinet Office paper of 19 July, and the agenda
was
expected to
cover:
•
US planning
and timescales;
•
objectives
of any military action;
•
the
strategic policy framework;
•
the
potential UK contribution; and
•
an
information campaign.184
417.
Mr Bowen
advised that it was “still too early to be definitive” about
whether the US
had a
winning military concept; but that it was “likely” that the answer
to that question
would be
“‘yes’ with certain conditions”. The key point for Mr Blair to
note was that US
action
could take place “very quickly, as early as November”.
418.
Agreeing the
objective for military action would be “useful”, but it begged
the
question of
the “strategic
policy framework in which to
take military action in pursuit of
that
objective”. “In particular a framework” was “required to set the
conditions for military
action
including the necessary justification in international law”. That
was “important
because it
may well constrain our ability to support US action”.
419.
Adm Boyce had
directed that UK planning should concentrate on two
“packages”:
•
a
supporting/enabling package, including basing, maritime and air
assets, in
which the
“the only land contribution would be Special Forces”;
and
•
a discrete
land contribution of a “division (minus)” for operations in
northern Iraq.
420.
Those two
packages had been chosen “because they effectively
represent
maximum
practical UK contributions to US‑led operations for either early or
later action”.
Schematic
timelines showing decision dates and readiness which could be
achieved
were
provided.
421.
Mr Bowen
advised that the “indications from the US” were that it did “not
expect a
ground
force contribution from the UK for operations out of Kuwait”; and
that “providing
land forces
to integrate with the US main effort in the South” had “been
discounted
because of
the severe difficulties we would face due to interoperability;
deployment time
and
geographic constraints affecting logistics in
particular”.
422.
Work was “now
being tailored” to a UK contribution from the north, although it
was
“difficult
to see how meaningful operations could be achieved outside the
framework of
a multi‑national
force such as the ARRC [Allied Rapid Reaction Corps] with the
support
of other
allies”.
184
Minute
Bowen to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting
with the Prime Minister’.
238