12.1 | Security Sector Reform

890. Major General James Dutton was GOC MND(SE) from June 2005 until December

2005. In his first report on 15 June he noted:

“… political pressure to clean up the Police Intelligence Unit (PIU) in Basra is

having some impact. For example, moves seem to be afoot to reform practices in

the Jameat [the police station where the PIU was based] through a new overseeing

judge and a new head of internal affairs. We also hear rumours that the PIU may

be subsumed into a larger MOI intelligence organisation.”850

891. A junior official in Baghdad emailed the IPU on 14 June to report that Mr Patey

had met Mr Jabr that day and raised Mr Abbas Allawi’s case.851 He had “stressed that

support from the top was needed to ensure that there was meaningful investigation – it

was necessary to embolden General Hassan”. Mr Jabr was supportive of action being

taken against the suspects and had established the investigation commission but

pointed out that it was the British who had chosen the police in the South.

892. Mr Fraser Wheeler, Deputy Consul General in Basra, emailed FCO officials on

15 June to report a mix‑up over who was the investigating judge on Mr Abbas Allawi’s

case.852 He wrote:

“I do not put this down to incompetence (though there is clearly some of that too)

but to deliberate obfuscation. We are being passed from pillar to post, and the Allawi

case is not receiving the treatment and attention a case of this nature deserves.”

893. On 16 June, Mr Wheeler and the Justice Sector Adviser met a senior judge in

Basra to discuss Mr Abbas Allawi’s case.853 In his record of the meeting, Mr Wheeler

reported that the case had been passed between four judges so far. It was important

that a police station without Jameat links conduct the investigation, but the branch had

officers in many stations. The Basra Judicial Committee would appoint an investigating

judge on 19 June.

894. Mr Wheeler wrote that, although there had been an autopsy and arrest warrants

had been issued for four suspects, none had been arrested because “no‑one dare arrest

them”. The judge had “commented that the judiciary is not afraid but is hampered by a

lack of support from the police who do not effect judicial orders”. Mr Wheeler wrote that

this was “hard to accept” given the reluctance to deal with the case.

895. An email from a junior official in IPU on 17 June reported that General Hassan

had “been fired”.854 There was concern over the impact that could have on progressing

Mr Abbas Allawi’s case and that those responsible may view General Hassan’s removal

as “proof that they are untouchable”.

850 Report Dutton, 15 June 2005, ‘CG MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 15 June 2005’.

851 Email FCO [junior official] to IPU [junior official], 14 June 2005, ‘Allawi Case – Minister of the Interior’.

852 Email Wheeler to FCO [junior officials], 15 June 2005, ‘Re: Allawi Case – Minister of the Interior’.

853 Email Wheeler to FCO [junior officials], 17 June 2005, ‘Allewi Case Update’.

854 Email IPU [junior official] to Patey, 17 June 2005, ‘Re: Allewi Case Update’.

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