10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
97.
Within the UK
Government, initial reactions to those developments were
mixed.
Some saw
them as an opportunity, others as undermining the UK’s work to
build
the
capacity of the provincial government (which risked being sidelined
by decisions
to channel
funds directly to line ministries, tribal leaders and
non‑governmental
organisations),
as a distraction for the UK team, and as a risk to the UK’s
reputation.
98.
Mr David
Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, wrote to Mr Brown in April,
describing
the Charge
of the Knights as “an opportunity” which had paved the way for
a
“proper and
respectable end” to the UK’s role as “lead partner in the
coalition” in
99.
The withdrawal
of civilian staff from Basra Palace in October 2006 came
as
frustrations
within some elements of the military over the lack of an
integrated
civilian‑military
effort reached a critical point.
100.
In March and
April 2003, the Government had adopted new structures,
centred
on the
AHMGIR, to co‑ordinate its work on Iraq in the post‑conflict
period. There
are no
indications that the Government considered how civilian teams from
different
departments
and the military would co‑ordinate their efforts on the ground. It
was left to
those teams
to determine how they should work together.
101.
In December
2006, Major General Richard Shirreff, General Officer
Commanding
(GOC)
MND(SE), wrote to Mr Blair proposing that the UK should establish a
Joint
Inter‑Agency
Task Force combining military and civilian reconstruction
expertise
under
military command. Lt Gen Shirreff told the Inquiry that, by that
time, the
“inter‑governmental
piece” had failed, and characterised his proposal as
“desperate
times and
desperate measures”.33
102.
Maj Gen
Shirreff’s proposal was the subject of heated debate within
the
Government.
Mr Blair expressed support for it, but it was rejected by the MOD,
other
senior
military officers, the FCO and DFID. Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr
Blair’s Foreign Policy
Adviser,
advised Mr Blair that there had been constant problems between
military and
civilian
teams in Basra “from the start” and concluded: “We must make a last
effort to get
a joined up
operation.”34
103.
The Government
concluded that it was not appropriate to establish a military
lead
for
reconstruction. The co‑location of MND(SE), the PRT and other
civilian teams at BAS
was
expected to help co‑ordination. In March 2007, the UK civilian and
military teams in
32
Letter
Miliband to Prime Minister, 29 April 2008, ‘Iraq’.
33
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 20‑21 and 42.
34
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly Update’
attaching Note Cabinet
Office, 5
January 2007, ‘Basra’.
543