The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

542. The Barry Report concluded that:

“No NBC filters for Challenger MBTs were received, leaving tanks with only six

hours of NBC protection … Insufficient NBC warning and monitoring equipment

was available.”276

543. In his post-operation tour report, Brigadier James Dutton, Commander

3 Commando Brigade, wrote:

“If the brigade had been subjected to a CBW attack we would at best have been

‘fighting to survive’ rather than ‘surviving to fight’ … Inadequate stocks of the NBC

consumables caused concern and uncertainty.”277

544. In his post-operation tour report, Brig Cowlam wrote that the lack of NBC kit was “a

major concern” and “unacceptable”.278

545. The NAO’s December 2003 Op TELIC report stated:

“Although overall protection against chemical agents was good, there was a

‘significant shortfall’ (some 40 percent) of Nerve Agent Immobilised Alarm and

Detector units … and a severe shortfall in Residual Vapour Detector kit availability …

While these shortfalls could be partially mitigated … it made detection and therefore

response to an attack inefficient.

“There were difficulties in providing Nuclear, Biological and Chemical protective suits

for certain sizes in sufficient numbers. In addition … some respirators did not fit as

well as had been presumed …

“A number of units reported shortages of necessary consumable items required

for the effective operation of chemical agent detector systems … The lack of these

items prevented units from turning on these systems in order to preserve some

reserve capability, amounting in some cases to between six and 24 hours worth of

operation.

“ … On Operation TELIC, the war reserve of filters was issued from central holdings

and dispatched to theatre. However, we found that these vehicle filters (for both

Challenger 2 and other armoured vehicles) had not been delivered to the frontline

units by the time of our field visit in late June 2003 … ”279

276 Report Land Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From a Land Perspective’.

277 Report, 8 May 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – 3 CDO Bde RM Post Operation Report’.

278 Report Cowlam, 12 May 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLOGC)

Jan – May 2003 Post Operation Report’.

279 National Audit Office, Operation TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq,

11 December 2003, HC 60.

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