The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
dismantled
its concealment mechanisms. This underscored “the importance
of
continued
vigilance and activity … on the issue of concealment”.
501.
Mr Butler
also expressed concern about the dangers of producing a list for
action
by Iraq, on
the grounds that it was “not unreasonable to consider that Iraq
might take
action to
satisfy that list positively” but not address any issues the
Commission did not
know about.
This would “effectively transfer the onus of establishing the basic
facts from
Iraq to the
Commission”. The Commission’s list “would become the standard of
proof,
not Iraq’s
… compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the
Council”.
502.
Mr Butler
concluded that:
“Iraq’s
heightened policy of disarmament by declaration, no matter how
vigorously
pursued or
stridently voiced, cannot remove the need for verification as the
key
means
through which the credibility of its claim can be
established.”
503.
On
7 April, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA,
submitted his
first
report to the Security Council on Iraq. He stated that there were
no indications of
prohibited
activities at any of the sites inspected by the IAEA and that all
equipment and
materials
which had been moved by Iraq had been returned to their former
locations.
Initial
inspections of the designated “Presidential sites” had “revealed no
immediate
indications”
of prohibited materials, equipment or activities.198
504.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that the IAEA had “no independently verifiable
information”
to verify
Iraqi claims that:
•
Lt Gen
Kamil had taken actions on the nuclear programme that
were
“independent,
unauthorized and without the knowledge of the Government
of
Iraq”.
•
It had not
followed up any offer of foreign assistance to its nuclear
programme
other than
the declared foreign assistance to its centrifuge
programme.
•
The “high
governmental committee”, which had initially been described
as
having been
established in June 1991 and headed by Mr Aziz, “had not, in
fact,
been an
established entity”.
505.
Dr ElBaradei
also reported that Iraq had “satisfactorily completed its
undertaking
to produce
a consolidated version of its full, final and complete declaration
of its
clandestine
nuclear programme” and “fulfilled its obligation to produce … a
summary of
the
technical achievements”. The latter document was regarded as
“consistent with” the
“picture”
of the programme developed by the IAEA.
198
UN Security
Council, 9 April 1998, ‘Letter dated 7 April 1998 from
the Director General of the
International
Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General’
(S/1998/312).
114