3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
“The moral
case against war has a moral answer: it is the moral case for
removing
Saddam. It
is not the reason we act. That must be according to the United
Nations
mandate on
weapons of mass destruction. But it is the reason, frankly, why if
we
do have
to act, we should do so with a clear conscience.
“Yes, there
are consequences of war. If we remove Saddam by force, people will
die
and some
will be innocent. And we must live with the consequences of our
actions,
even the
unintended ones.
“But there
are also consequences of ‘stop the war’.
“If I … did
not insist on disarmament … there would be no war. But there would
still
be Saddam …
ruling the Iraqi people …
“This isn’t
a regime with weapons of mass destruction that is otherwise
benign.
This is
a regime that contravenes every single principle or value anyone of
our
politics
believes in.
“There will
be no march for the victims of Saddam …
“I rejoice
that we live in a country where peaceful process is a natural part
of the
democratic
process …
“I do not
seek unpopularity as a badge of honour. But sometimes it is the
price
of leadership.
And the cost of conviction.”
459.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair’s speech was heard “in near silence … It
was well
received,
not least because it was so serious”. Mr Blair had been
“confident and felt we
had the
right argument and we now needed a big strategy to put the case
properly”.120
460.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote that he had been determined that “people
should
not be
able to hide from the ghastly reality of Saddam continuing in
power”.121
461.
After the
discussions in the Security Council on 14 February,
Dr Blix
proposed
consideration of a “benchmark approach” using “clusters” of
issues
being
identified as part of the work programme required by resolution
1284.
462.
Mr Straw
spoke briefly to Dr Blix about the next steps after the
presentation
on 14 February.
The report of the discussion stated that Dr Blix:
•
had decided
that Iraq had to destroy the (Volga) missile engines;
•
did not
think it worth pursuing any ultimatum which required Saddam to quit
Iraq;
120
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
121
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
263