The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
63.
The CIG judged
that the situation in MND(SE) remained “fragile” and that
there
had been
considerable loss of public support for the MNF. Most Shia were
likely to
continue to
support the political process, but their consent depended on
expectations
being met,
including elections held on schedule and a government that
reflected
their majority
status.
64.
A continuing
failure to improve public order, restore public services or create
jobs
would also
increase disillusionment, risking renewed unrest.
65.
During
Mr Benn’s visit to Iraq, officials in the British Embassy
Office Basra raised
concerns
over the operation of the World Bank and UN Trust
Funds.30
66.
DFID responded
to those concerns on 6 September:
“Basra are
right that getting PCO and Trust Fund programmes moving faster
is
critical,
but not that our contribution to the Trust Funds is
pointless.”
67.
The Trust
Funds had several purposes:
“•
to deliver
reconstruction on the ground;
•
to allow
donors to pool resources and streamline procedures. This
reduces
their
overheads, and gives the Iraqis fewer donors with their own
priorities
and procedures
to negotiate with; and
•
to
encourage the UN and the World Bank to re-engage”.
68.
The World Bank
and the UN had now started disbursing money from the
Trust
Funds, and
the Iraqi Minister for Planning and Development Co-ordination had
told
Mr Benn
that he was “much happier” with collaboration with the World Bank
and UN.
69.
DFID concluded
the Trust Funds had been set up “to deliver medium-term
benefits
to Iraq
rather than quick fixes”. The test now was delivery.
70.
On 9
September, Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Mr David Quarrey, a Private
Secretary to
Mr Blair,
sent Mr Blair a minute reporting on their recent visit to
Iraq, for use in Mr Blair’s
video
conference with President Bush later that day.31
71.
The minute
stated that a “joined up programme” was needed,
including:
•
an
effective counter-insurgency strategy to “regain control of cities
in the
Sunni triangle”;
•
an IIG
strategy for Sunni outreach;
•
support for
Prime Minister Allawi’s office; and
30
Telegram 1
DFID to FCO Baghdad, 6 September 2004, ‘Southern Iraq: Trust
Funds’.
31
Minute
Sheinwald and Quarrey to Blair, 9 September 2004,
‘Iraq’.
208