The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the outcome
of their talks … There is a clear and present danger and we
must
face
it.”
•
Saddam
Hussein should tell the UN that he was prepared to admit
inspection
teams and
prove that was a realistic option.
•
Action in
Iraq would be “on an altogether different scale” from Afghanistan.
And
there would
not be a rebel force “similar to the Northern Alliance” to take
that
military
action.
•
If Saddam
Hussein was to be toppled, there was a need to “be certain to win
the
peace as
well as any war”. That meant “considering a post-Saddam Iraq”
before
acting, and
considering “reconstruction, humanitarian aid and the
massive
difficulty
of filling the political vacuum left by the regime of a
dictator”.
•
Nor could
there be any “support for any form of separation or any
breakaway
state”.
•
If, as he
believed, the Government had “considered Iraq’s
long-term
requirements”
and should be supported, “Those who continue to argue
that
containment
is sufficient must answer the charge of naivety.”74
218.
Responding to
the points raised in the debate, Mr Bradshaw stated that there
were
“no
proposals, only speculation”.75
He agreed
that everything possible should be done to
avoid
military action. Mr Annan would be holding talks with Iraq in New
York the following
day, but Mr
Bradshaw said it remained to be seen if Iraq was serious. Saddam
Hussein
had
embarked on charm offensives before and they had come to nothing.
Iraq was “a
state
sponsor of terrorism” but the main concern was “its determination
to build weapons
of mass
destruction and the threat it poses, not just to its neighbours,
but to the rest of
the world”.
The UK was actively pursuing diplomacy. In the “hypothetical
circumstances”
of military
action, the legal view was that Iraq was in “flagrant breach” of
both UN
resolutions
and the cease-fire agreement, “which made the cease-fire no longer
valid”.
Iraq was
“unique” in that it had used chemical weapons against its
neighbours and its
own
people.
219.
Mr Bradshaw
added that all the Labour members who had spoken in the
debate
opposing
the Government’s policy had opposed the policy in Afghanistan and
Kosovo:
“They were
wrong then, and they are wrong now.”
220.
During Prime
Minister’s Questions (PMQs) later that day, Ms Diane Abbott
(Labour)
asked if Mr
Blair was:
“… aware of
the growing concern in the country that we may be moving by
degrees
towards war
with Iraq? Does he accept that in the event that British troops are
sent
into
action, there should be a debate and a vote on the Floor of the
House?”76
74
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 6 March
2002, columns 84-85WH.
75
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 6 March
2002, column 87WH.
76
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 6 March
2002, column 287.
424