15.1 | Civilian
personnel
569.
Mr Bowen
reported that: “Extracting people from current jobs, security
training and
the
logistics of deployment often take longer than we would
want.”
570.
In November
2003, the FCO Iraq Operations Unit (IOU) advised Sir Michael
Jay
that
recruitment and succession planning were
“difficult”.376
A number of
volunteers had
dropped out
in recent weeks. Staffing requirements were “just about manageable”
but
would
become more difficult if security deteriorated.
571.
At a meeting
with Sir Michael Jay on 25 November, Sir Hilary Synnott
reported
vacancies
in “key areas” in Basra and advised that, unless there was “a more
positive
approach to
recruitment, the whole policy risked failure”.377
572.
Sir Hilary
reported that he had discussed the issue with Mr Straw, who
had
suggested
that “the [FCO] administration (and by extension other departments
in
Whitehall)
should try to encourage people by pointing out the career
advantages”.
Sir Hilary
had suggested paying people more.
573.
Sir Michael
Jay told Sir Hilary Synnott there were drawbacks to those
proposals:
“The strong
view hitherto in Whitehall had been that all postings to Iraq
should be
volunteers.
Andrew Turnbull had also taken the view that we should not try to
pay
people the
market rate to get them there. This would work for the private
sector,
but not for
us with our duty of care to staff, which was uppermost in the minds
of
a number of
my Permanent Secretary colleagues … It was important to
maintain
Whitehall
solidarity if possible.”
574.
On 5 December,
Sir Hilary Synnott advised that recruitment had been made
more
difficult
by “the widely held perception that secondment to Basra might
involve danger,
discomfort
and long hours with little reward (although seen from here, some of
these
concerns
are exaggerated)”.378
Sir Hilary
expressed sympathy with the view put in
London that
imprecise and changing job descriptions presented an additional
obstacle,
but argued
that tasks could not be defined until there was an expert on the
ground:
“We should
not become mesmerised by job descriptions. The main thing is to
have
relatively
expert people on the ground in sufficient numbers and quickly.
Resourceful
officers
will find plenty to do for themselves. Contracts need to be
sufficiently flexible
to allow
for this.”
575.
In his
valedictory on 26 January 2004, Sir Hilary Synnott expressed
frustration at
the slow
deployment of staff, complicated by the short tours which
constantly led to gaps
between
appointments:
“… it was
brought home to me that officials could not be deployed like the
military,
despite
notional mobility obligations; that the contracting processes to
employ
376
Minute
Parham to PS/PUS, 25 November 2003, ‘Iraq – Sir H Synnott’s
call on the PUS today’.
377
Minute Jay
to Parham, 25 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Call by Sir Hilary
Synnott’.
378
Telegram 51
Basra to FCO London, 5 December 2003, ‘South Iraq: Before and After
Transition’.
345