9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
“Clearance
to proceed is sought urgently, as the opportunity for negotiations
with
JAM will
not remain open indefinitely.”
45.
The advice was
not explicit about what would constitute “satisfactory terms” for
such
an
agreement, but recorded that JAM1 had “insisted” on the release of
two detainees
at the
start of the month and asked for suspension of MND(SE) strike
operations for the
duration.
He was likely to seek the release of two further detainees at the
end of the
month but
would be given “no guarantee on these releases at the outset”. The
advice did
not say
what level of reduction in JAM violence would be considered to be
satisfactory.
46.
The senior
official recommended that the discussions should proceed. He
reiterated
the
background information provided by a colleague on 20 June about the
trial cease-fire
and
subsequent discussions (Section 9.5), and reported views from UK
officials in Iraq:
“From the
local perspective, GOC MND(SE) and HMCG [the British Consul
General]
Basra
strongly support moving to the next phase (i.e. the release of the
two ‘orange’
detainees
and initiation of a further, month-long mutual reduction in
violence).
HMA and
SBMR-I, from their Baghdad perspective, understand the attractions
of
engagement
with JAM1 but believe that these negotiations need to be
considered
in the
wider coalition and Iraq context. In particular, they are concerned
that the
GoI could
be suspicious, and that General Petraeus would want to consider how
to
integrate
this proposal with wider coalition efforts at engagement, which
have been
directed
mainly at Sunni elements but include Shia parties and groups.
SBMR-I
states that
any suspension of strike activity in Basra Province and the release
of
the two
‘red’ detainees would require General Petraeus’ consent (since US
forces
in reality
operate independently in MND(SE)). SBMR-I warns that General
Petraeus
would be
unlikely to agree to suspend US strike operations in MND(SE).
SBMR-I
and HMA
also suggest … drive a harder bargain with JAM1, limiting the
cease-fire to
Basra City
(rather than the whole Province), and insisting he take
responsibility for
stopping
EFP [Explosively Formed Projectile] attacks as well as mortar and
rocket
attacks
(which otherwise would require MND(SE) strike action in
response).”
47.
The senior
official explained that if Mr Miliband agreed, Lt Gen Lamb
would brief
Gen
Petraeus and the Iraqi Government. Subject to their views, and
“further negotiation”
with JAM1
on terms, the two “orange” detainees would be released to trigger
the
month‑long
reduction of violence. During that month there would be discussion
of further
detainee
releases. The senior official wrote that conduct of the discussion
would be
agreed be
between GOC MND(SE), SBMR-I, the British Consul General in Basra
and
the British
Ambassador to Iraq, and that Mr Richmond, Mr Bowen and
VAdm Style in
London
would consult Ministers as appropriate.
48.
Risks of the
proposal were that the Iraqi Government would reject and react
badly to
it (judged
to be “significant”); that Gen Petraeus would reject it; that
divisions within JAM
could be
used as an excuse for continued attacks in Basra; that the talks
would prompt
attacks
from other groups, who saw them as a threat to their position in
Basra; and that
191