The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
855.
The briefing
paper for Mr Blair prepared by the FCO Middle East
Department
on 30 January
described the objectives for the meeting as:
“to
convince President Bush that:
•
our
strategy, though working, needs more time;
•
the
military campaign will be very shocking in many parts of the
world,
especially
in its opening phase (five times the bombing of the
[1991]
Gulf War);
•
a second UN
Security Council resolution (i) would greatly strengthen
the
US’s
position, (ii) is politically essential for the UK, and almost
certainly
legally
essential as well;
•
we should
support Saudi ideas for disarmament and regime change
with
UN blessing;
•
the US
needs to pay much more attention, quickly, to planning on ‘day
after’
issues; and
that the UN needs to be central to it.”279
856.
The paper set
out a number of key messages for Mr Blair to convey
to
President Bush
reflecting those objectives, including:
•
More time
would not be “stringing things out: it is patience with a
purpose”.
The disarmament
of Iraqi WMD and the departure of Saddam Hussein could
be achieved
“with wide international support”, but we were “not there
yet”.
•
There were
three strategic advantages in “letting time work for
us”:
{{
The military
build‑up was “already producing some signs of fracturing in
the
regime. We
will lose nothing by letting the pressure build. We might
be able
to achieve
our objectives without firing a shot.”
{{
Inspections
were “beginning to produce results … The Iraqis are
rattled.
They are
showing signs of non‑co‑operation (U2s, interviews). Blix
brought
this out
very clearly in New York … shifting the terms of the debate
against
Iraq. More
time will increase the evidence of systematic failure by
Saddam
to comply.
Before long likely to produce compelling evidence of
Iraqi
deceit …”
{{
The mounting
pressure was “finally galvanising moderate Arabs to
work
with us to
get Saddam out using the leverage of a second
resolution.
We need to
build up a plan on the basis of Prince Saud’s [Saudi
Arabian
Foreign
Minister] ideas covering who would have to go, and how
we
would
handle a transition to a new group of leaders who would meet
Iraq’s
obligations
under our supervision.”
279
Paper FCO
[MED], 30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Camp David, 31
January: Iraq’.
156