Executive
Summary
185.
Mr Blair
thought that was “highly damaging” but “inevitable”: “They felt as
strongly
as I did;
and they weren’t prepared to indulge the US, as they saw
it.”
186.
Mr Blair
concluded that for moral and strategic reasons the UK should be
with
the US
and that:
“... [W]e
should make a last ditch attempt for a peaceful solution. First to
make
the moral
case for removing Saddam ... Second, to try one more time to
reunite
the international
community behind a clear base for action in the event of
a
continuing
breach.”
187.
On 3 March,
Mr Blair proposed an approach focused on setting a deadline
of
17 March
for Iraq to disclose evidence relating to the destruction of
prohibited items
and permit
interviews; and an amnesty if Saddam Hussein left Iraq by 21
March.80
188.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that the level of support in the UK for
military action
without a
second resolution was palpably “very low”. In that circumstance,
even if a
majority in
the Security Council had voted for the resolution with only France
exercising
its veto,
he was “increasingly pessimistic” about support within the Labour
Party for
military
action.81
The debate
in the UK was:
“...
significantly defined by the tone of the debate in Washington and
particularly
remarks
made by the President and others to the right of him, which
suggested that
the US
would go to war whatever and was not bothered about a second
resolution
one way or
another.”
189.
Following a
discussion with Mr Blair, Mr Straw told Secretary Powell
that Mr Blair:
“... was
concerned that, having shifted world (and British) public opinion
over the
months, it
had now been seriously set back in recent days. We were not in the
right
position.
The Prime Minister was considering a number of ideas which he might
well
190.
Mr Straw
recorded that Secretary Powell had advised that, if Mr Blair
wanted
to make
proposals, he should do so quickly. The US was not enthusiastic
about the
inclusion
of an immunity clause for Saddam Hussein in the
resolution.
191.
Mr Straw
reported that Secretary Powell had told President Bush that he
judged
a vetoed
resolution would no longer be possible for the UK. Mr Straw
said that without
a second
resolution approval for military action could be “beyond
reach”.
80
Note
(handwritten) [Blair], 3 March 2003, [untitled].
81
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
82
Letter
Straw to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin
Powell, 3 March’.
27