4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

• Unconventional use of CBW – “Although there is no intelligence to indicate

Iraq has considered using chemical and biological agents in terrorist attacks,

we cannot rule out the possibility. […] Saddam could also remove his existing

constraints on dealing with Al Qaida … Intelligence indicates that Saddam

has specifically commissioned a team of scientists to devise novel means of

deploying CBW.”

• “At the death” – “In the last resort Saddam is likely to order the indiscriminate

use of whatever chemical and biological weapons remain available to him, in a

last attempt to cling on to power or to cause as much damage as possible in a

final act of vengeance. If he has not already done so by this stage Saddam will

launch CBW attacks on Israel. Implementation of such orders would depend on

the delivery means still available, the survivability of the command chain and the

willingness of commanders to obey.”

255. The JIC acknowledged that much of the Assessment was “necessarily based

on judgement and assessment”.

256. The Butler Report highlighted that the new judgements relied heavily

on inferences made by the JIC in its assessment of recently received

intelligence reports.

257. Mr Scarlett told the Hutton Inquiry that the Key Judgements in a JIC Assessment:

“… represent the formal view of the JIC on the central questions which are being

considered in the Assessment itself. They are not a summary of the main points

in the text. They are a bringing together and drawing on existing JIC Assessments,

a wide body of information which may be outside, much of it open source, secret

intelligence, in addition, and other relevant factors, such as past behaviour, past

actions and so on.”115

258. In response to the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report in February

2004, the Government stated that the purpose of the Key Judgements section of

JIC Assessments was “to highlight the judgements to be drawn from the intelligence

assessed”; it was “not intended to be a summary of the main facts in the paper”.116

259. The Butler Report stated that the JIC Assessment of 9 September “was prepared

in parallel with the Assessment of 21 August”, and that:

“Its tone was set by its first Key Judgement, which reflected a significant

change from previous JIC judgements on Iraqi possession of chemical and

biological weapons.”117

115 The Hutton Inquiry, public hearing, 23 September 2003, pages 79-80.

116 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass

Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, 11 September 2003, Cm6118, February 2004, paragraph 7.

117 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 294.

161