The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The “most
significant issue” was that the majority of RVDs had been
found
to be
unserviceable, but that a “workaround” solution had been found. It
had
been agreed
with DJW and PJHQ that this was “not a showstopper”
although
it would
“impose a degree of operational degradation” which would increase
as
temperatures
in theatre rose.
•
New
respirators were being procured and it was expected that this
delivery
would
“enable 99.5% of personnel” to have a respirator that would fit
them.
•
Further
investigation had revealed there were sufficient stocks of
ComboPens.
•
Further
briefing would be provided to the Chiefs of Staff the following
week.
391.
An attached
annex on the overall sustainability assessment of equipment
stated
that
helicopter support remained fragile, despite a reduction in flying
hours. That was
attributed
to long lead times for spare parts, and “historic levels of STP
[Short Term Plan]
funding”.
392.
On
3 March, Adm Boyce was advised by Lt Gen Reith that
equipment procured
through
UORs was being prioritised for fitting and being carefully
monitored, but it was
“probable”
that some equipment would not be in service as the UK crossed “the
line of
departure”.192
The “some”
was referenced with a footnote stating: “The original
RDD
[Required
Delivery Date] for the UORs was 31 March 03.”
393.
Priorities had
been set by PJHQ based on four categories:
•
Priority 1:
“UORs with the potential to delay the start of operations”,
including
Combat ID,
Challenger 2 desertisation measures, NBC equipment and
battlefield
ambulances.
•
Priority 2:
UORs that enhance combat operations.
•
Priority 3:
“enablers” for aftermath operations.
•
Priority 4:
“Others”.
394.
Lt Gen
Reith wrote that the late delivery of some UORs meant that
deployment and
prioritisation
issues would become “more acute” as the date for operations
approached.
He added:
“Any decision not to fit a UOR will be based on operational advice
by theatre
and
recorded.”
395.
The record of
Lord Bach’s meeting on 3 March stated:
“… the
major remaining area of concern was in NBC. Although things were
not as
bad as had
been feared, with the respirator and ComboPen issues – for the
time
being –
resolved, there were still outstanding concerns about some aspects
of our
CBRN
‘layered defence.’”193
192
Minute CJO
to CDS, 3 March 2003, ‘Fitting of Op TELIC Urgent Operational
Requirements (UORs)’.
193
Minute
APS/Minister(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Op
TELIC – UORs’.
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