The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
196.
Mr Lee
pointed out that the US military took a different view of whether
action
in Basra
would affect the position in Baghdad.
197.
Mr Lee
advised that a separate submission would address the targeting
of
communications
facilities.
198.
A manuscript
comment by Sir Kevin Tebbit on Mr Lee’s advice
said:
“Two
points:
(a) the
need to put across the overall strategy and progress towards it, to
avoid
excessive
focus on tactical ‘pinprick’ setback …
(b) the
importance of ensuring that judgement about Basra v
Baghdad
… should be
based on military risk/benefit considerations rather
than
feel under
particular political pressure to strike a blow for
exemplary
humanitarian,
or other, reasons.” 129
199.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office wrote to Sir David Manning on 25 March
stating:
“It is
planned to conduct attacks over the next few nights which are
intended to
degrade
Iraqi command and control. These may also have the consequence
of
stopping
some media facilities. It is important that any public statements
on these
attacks
emphasise that it is ‘command and control’ which is being attacked
– not
‘propaganda’
facilities.” 130
200.
In preparation
for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Camp David
from
26 to 27
March, Mr Watkins provided an assessment on 25 March of
progress against
the
campaign tasks.131
He
reported:
“Southern
Iraq is effectively under Coalition control although significant
resistance
remains in
Basra.
“7 Armoured
Brigade dominates the Basra area and has defeated
hard-core
resistance
in nearby az-Zubayr. Significant irregular forces remain in Basra
…
There may
be a trade-off between the effort that would be required to
defeat
them and
the need to maintain the tempo of the Coalition’s main effort (the
push
northwards
to Baghdad).
“… al-Faw
Peninsula, Umm Qasr and the southern oilfields have been secured
…
3 Commando
Brigade is in control … US 15th … MEF released to return to 1
MEF.
“16 Air
Assault Brigade deployed in southern oilfields.”
129
Manuscript
comment Tebbit on Minute Lee to PS/PUS [MOD], PSO/CDS, 25 March
2003, ‘TELIC:
Information
Campaign’.
130
Letter
Williams to Manning, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Targeting’.
131
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to
Washington. Iraq: Review of
the military
situation’.
34