7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
298.
Mr Blair
set out his concerns about:
•
proliferators
of nuclear equipment or expertise;
•
“dictatorships
with highly repressive regimes” who were “desperately
trying
to acquire”
chemical, biological or, “particularly, nuclear weapons
capability”
– some of
those were “a short time away from having a serviceable
nuclear
weapon”,
and that activity was increasing, not diminishing; and
•
the
possibility of terrorist groups obtaining and using weapons of
mass
destruction,
including a “radiological bomb”.
299.
Those two
threats had very different motives and different origins. He
accepted
“fully”
that the association between the two was:
“… loose –
but it is hardening. The possibility of the two coming together –
of
terrorist
groups in possession of weapons of mass destruction or even of a so
called
dirty
radiological bomb – is now in my judgement, a real and present
danger to
Britain and
its national security.”
300.
Later in his
speech, Mr Blair stated that the threat which Saddam
Hussein’s
arsenal
posed:
“… to
British citizens at home and abroad cannot simply be contained.
Whether in
the hands
of his regime or in the hands of the terrorists to whom he would
give his
weapons,
they pose a clear danger to British citizens …”
301.
This fusion of
long-standing concerns about proliferation with the
post-9/11
concerns
about mass-casualty terrorism was at the heart of the Government’s
case
for taking
action at this time against Iraq.
302.
The UK
assessment of Iraq’s capabilities set out in Section 4 of the
Report shows:
•
The
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their
delivery
systems,
particularly ballistic missiles, was regarded as a major threat.
But Iran,
North Korea
and Libya were of greater concern than Iraq in terms of the risk
of
nuclear and
missile proliferation.
•
JIC
Assessments, reflected in the September 2002 dossier, had
consistently
taken the
view that, if sanctions were removed or became ineffective, it
would
take Iraq
at least five years following the end of sanctions to produce
enough
fissile
material for a weapon. On 7 March, the IAEA had reported to
the Security
Council
that there was no indication that Iraq had resumed its nuclear
activities.
•
The
September dossier stated that Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon
within
one to two
years if it obtained fissile material and other essential
components
from a
foreign supplier. There was no evidence that Iraq had tried to
acquire
fissile
material and other components or – were it able to do so – that it
had
the technical
capabilities to turn these materials into a usable
weapon.
609