The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Saddam is
prepared to order missile strikes against Israel, with
chemical
or biological
warheads, in order to widen the war once hostilities
begin.
•
Saddam
could order the use of CBW weapons in order to deny space
and
territory
to Coalition Forces, or to cause casualties, slow any advance, and
sap
US
morale.
•
If not
previously employed, Saddam will order the indiscriminate use of
whatever
CBW weapons
remain available late in a ground campaign or as a final
act
of
vengeance. But such an order would depend on the availability of
delivery
means and
the willingness of commanders to obey.”114
251.
The Assessment
stated that it had taken “account of new intelligence that
has
recently
become available on Iraq’s intentions”. Unusually, it stated
explicitly that it had
“an
intelligence cut off point of 4 September”.
252.
To provide
context, the Introduction to the Assessment stated:
“Recent
intelligence casts light on Iraq’s holdings of weapons of mass
destruction
and on its
doctrine for using them. Intelligence remains limited and Saddam’s
own
unpredictability
complicates judgements about Iraqi use of these weapons.
Much
of this
paper is necessarily based on judgement and
assessment.”
“Iraq used
chemical weapons on a large scale during the Iran/Iraq War. Use on
the
same scale
now would require large quantities of chemical weapons and
survivable
delivery
means in the face of overwhelming US air superiority. Iraq did not
use
chemical
weapons during the [1991] Gulf War. Intelligence suggests that Iraq
may
have used
the biological agent, aflatoxin, against the Shia population in
1991. We
do not
believe that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons and there is no
intelligence that
Iraq is
currently interested in radiological dispersal
devices.”
254.
Other key
elements of the Assessment are set out in the Box
below.
Chemical
and biological capabilities
“Based on
intelligence on the nature of Iraqi CBW weapons, known delivery
means,
continuing
procurement activity, and experience from previous conflicts”, the
JIC judged:
•
Iraq currently
had available “either from pre Gulf War stocks or more
recent
production,
a number of biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare
(CW)
agents and
weapons”.
114
JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons –
Possible Scenarios’.
158