The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
from the
north to Helmand province in the south, with an infantry
battlegroup and full
helicopter
support.89
Section 9.4
addresses the decision in detail.
133.
The MOD paper
which informed the decision advised that this option,
which
comprised
“around 2,500 personnel in total”, would:
“Place
greatest pressure on internal MOD resourcing. It would impact on
the
individual
personnel deployed, particularly those in ‘pinch-point’ trades who
may
have been
deployed on operations significantly more than Departmental
guidelines
advise;
stretch the MOD’s logistic capability at a time when force level
reductions in
Iraq cannot
be guaranteed; and place strain on key enablers …”90
134.
The MOD paper
concluded with a brief report on plans for UK military
drawdown
in Iraq.
It cautioned that:
“… any
substantial prolongation of the UK military commitment in Iraq at
current
force
levels would have significant impact on individual personnel, the
logistic
feasibility
of any commitment in Afghanistan, and overall
resourcing.”
135.
The minutes of
the DOP meeting do not indicate that there was any discussion
of
the
specific impact on the Iraq campaign of the proposed deployment to
Helmand.91
136.
Gen Jackson
was briefed, in advance of a 17 January 2006 meeting with
the
House of
Lords Defence Group, that:
“Depending
on campaign progress in Iraq, there is potential for
some
‘concurrency challenges’
in 2006/07. We must try to avoid ‘overstretch’, but not
end
up ‘under
stretched’ – particularly when the competition for resources in
Whitehall
137.
On the same
day, Dr Roger Hutton, MOD Director Joint Commitments
Policy,
provided Dr
Reid with advice on the timing and detail of the deployment of UK
forces
to Helmand
province.93
Dr Hutton
advised that the Chiefs of Staff recommended the
immediate
deployment of the full Helmand Task Force (HTF).
That recommendation was
“crucially
dependent” on fulfilling three criteria, including:
“Achievability
within current UK commitments. The HTF, taken together with
the
HQ ARRC
deployment, calls on a variety of capabilities, and a lengthy and
complex
logistic
tail. With the continued commitment to Iraq through 2006, this
presents
significant
but manageable challenges, particularly for logistic enablers
(including
air
transport). During this period we will still be able to undertake
immediate
contingency
operations, but on a limited basis.”
89
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP meeting.
90
Paper MOD,
19 July 2005, ‘Afghanistan: Resources and Strategic
Planning’.
91
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP meeting.
92
Briefing,
[undated], ‘CGS Address to House of Lords Defence Group – 17 Jan
06’.
93
Minute
Hutton to APS/SofS [MOD], 17 January 2006, ‘Afghanistan
Deployments’.
26