6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
•
“Resistance
activity: … Both
SCIRI … and the Dawa Party would appear
to have
well-established urban support networks … and have over the
years
committed
numerous acts of sabotage and assassination … Equally we
assume
that urban
support structures for the rural based Shia opposition … may
well
exist. The
Iraqi Communist Party might also retain an underground
presence.
We have
little idea of the size or capability of such groups but many
resistance
networks
might try to seize controls of local neighbourhoods within the
southern
cities …
once the regime has collapsed … Many of these groups have
access
to
considerable weaponry including small arms and RPGs [Rocket
Propelled
Grenades].”
619.
The DIS stated
that some of the groups “may pursue an agenda inimical
to
Coalition
interests … and might resent Coalition presence”; and that
criminals and
opportunists
“looking to exploit the situation would supplement resistance
groups
pursuing an
‘anti-Saddam’ agenda”.
620.
The DIS also
warned that:
“The
continued activity of armed groups will set a dangerous precedent
for Basra’s
future
political landscape. We must expect political groupings with a
religious
(Shia)
agenda and Iranian backing to emerge very quickly within Basra (and
across
southern
Iraq) … [I]t would be highly destabilising for such groups to base
their
political
influence on their control of armed elements. The armed wings of
such
groups will
need to be disarmed or disbanded.”
621.
The DIS also
warned that it expected the civil police “at least initially” to
“disappear
from view”,
and that many of the population were “fearful of a generalised
breakdown
in law and
order”. Disarming the populace “might be interpreted as running
contrary
to cultural
norms and could be resisted”.
622.
The DIS had
“no intelligence on regime planning to mount an urban
defence
of Basra
City” but stated that “individual or localised resistance could
occur”. It also
identified
the forces which were likely to be at the disposal of the regime.
Those are
set out in
Section 8.
623.
The DIS advice
on reactions to subsequent Coalition control of Basra,
including
the
assessment that UK forces would be “required in the city to provide
security”,
is
addressed in Section 6.5.
624.
General Franks
wrote in his memoir that:
“Intel[ligence]
estimated that the vast majority of Basra’s population of almost
one
million
Shiites would remain neutral, neither helping nor hindering, while
the British
dealt with
the Ba’athist leadership of the garrison.”213
213
Franks T
& McConnell M. American
Soldier. HarperCollins,
2004.
485