The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
613.
Mr Wood
remained concerned about the references to the “Kosovo
model”
providing a
precedent and that the draft resolution then under discussion did
not
have the
effect of reviving the authority to use force.
614.
Mr Wood
wrote to Mr Chaplin on 17 October to express concerns about
Mr Blair’s
statement,
reported in the record of a conversation with President Bush on 14
October,
that:
“… the
Kosovo model would allow a return to the Security Council for a
further
discussion
in the event of a further breach by Iraq; but if there were UN
inaction
(i.e. no
second UN resolution authorising the use of force) we would take
action.”199
615.
Mr Wood
was “concerned that the conversation does not take full account of
legal
advice”.
The legal justification for action in Kosovo was an overwhelming
humanitarian
catastrophe
which could not be prevented by any other means. That was not
the
position in
Iraq. The “Kosovo model” was “no authority for a proposition that
action would
be legally
justified if authority from the Security Council had been sought
but without
success”.
The facts available to Mr Wood did “not justify action in
self‑defence”. “The
use of
force would, therefore, be unlawful unless authorised by the
Security Council.”
“There is
currently no express authorisation to use force against Iraq, nor
would
a
resolution on the lines discussed … give an implied authorisation
based on the
revival of
the authority to use force contained in resolution 678 (1990).
Subject
to
consideration of a final text (and the circumstances of its
adoption), a finding
of material
breach in OP1 of the current text, followed by a long list of
provisions
detailing
the action which the Council expects Iraq to take, together with a
final
paragraph
which indicates that the Council would need to meet in the case of
a
further
breach by Iraq, or some such, would not permit the revival
argument. Rather,
it would
point to further action to be taken by Iraq, and then by the
Council if Iraq
were not to
co‑operate.
“In my
view, we need to write urgently to No.10 recalling the legal
position.”
617.
When
Mr Wood saw Mr Rycroft’s record of Mr Blair’s
meeting on 17 October,
he sent
an “urgent and personal” minute to Mr Ricketts,
stating:
“The
concerns in my minute to Edward Chaplin earlier today are
reinforced by [the]
record of
the Prime Minister’s meeting this morning, suggesting that ‘if for
some
reason
[such as a French or Russian veto] there were no second resolution
… we
and the US
would take action’.
199
Minute Wood
to Chaplin, 17 October 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone Call with
Bush, 14 October’.
310