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14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)
“So the first time the request was made, we met it immediately with £90 million,
and that was a decision that military commanders could make only themselves as to
when and where they needed these new vehicles …”
631.  Sir Peter Spencer, the Chief of Defence Procurement from May 2003 to March
2007, told the Inquiry that he used to call regularly on the three single Service Chiefs
of Staff, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the three Commanders in Chief and that:
“If there had been concerns about UORs, they would have been raised.”327
632.  Sir Peter later observed:
“… if it had been a problem somebody would have come to me and said … Chiefs
of Staff aren’t backwards in coming forward. If they think something is not right they
let you know.”328
633.  Several witnesses, in their evidence to the Inquiry, explained that hardening
vehicles was just one way of protecting troops and emphasised the importance of
tactics, techniques and procedures.
634.  Asked whether he had been concerned about the vulnerability of Snatch in Iraq,
ACM Stirrup replied:
“Very concerned. We wanted to get rid of Snatch outside the wire as quickly
as possible but you can’t get rid of it by using just a big, heavy vehicle … it is a
mistake to believe that simply by increasing the armour on a vehicle, you can defeat
an improvised explosive device. You have to take a broad spectrum approach.
You have to improve your detection of the devices … You have to provide as much
physical protection in terms of armour as is consistent with the mission … but,
crucially, you have … to attack the people who are doing this.”329
635.  When asked specifically for his reflections on “the growth of the IED threat or
Iranian influence”, in the context of a wider question on the development of particular
trends or any notable events during his tenure, ACM Torpy wrote:
“During my time as CJO we saw a gradual, although not dramatic rise in the
number of IED/EFP attacks against UK troops. Considerable effort was directed at
developing tactics, techniques and procedures to mitigate the threat … whilst at the
same time seeking improvements to equipment, particularly the introduction of new
electronic warfare equipment, additional vehicle armour and better body armour for
personnel. Additional intelligence effort was also directed against IED/EFP networks
to enable disruption operations to be undertaken.”330
327  Public hearing, 26 July 2010, page 27.
328  Public hearing, 26 July 2010, page 31.
329  Public hearing, 1 February 2010, page 71.
330  Statement, 14 June 2010, page 7.
107
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