14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
“So the
first time the request was made, we met it immediately with £90
million,
and that
was a decision that military commanders could make only themselves
as to
when and
where they needed these new vehicles …”
631.
Sir Peter
Spencer, the Chief of Defence Procurement from May 2003 to
March
2007, told
the Inquiry that he used to call regularly on the three single
Service Chiefs
of Staff,
the Chief of the Defence Staff and the three Commanders in Chief
and that:
“If there
had been concerns about UORs, they would have been
raised.”327
632.
Sir Peter
later observed:
“… if it
had been a problem somebody would have come to me and said …
Chiefs
of Staff
aren’t backwards in coming forward. If they think something is not
right they
633.
Several
witnesses, in their evidence to the Inquiry, explained that
hardening
vehicles
was just one way of protecting troops and emphasised the importance
of
tactics,
techniques and procedures.
634.
Asked whether
he had been concerned about the vulnerability of Snatch in
Iraq,
ACM Stirrup
replied:
“Very
concerned. We wanted to get rid of Snatch outside the wire as
quickly
as possible
but you can’t get rid of it by using just a big, heavy vehicle … it
is a
mistake to
believe that simply by increasing the armour on a vehicle, you can
defeat
an
improvised explosive device. You have to take a broad spectrum
approach.
You have
to improve your detection of the devices … You have to provide as
much
physical
protection in terms of armour as is consistent with the mission …
but,
crucially,
you have … to attack the people who are doing
this.”329
635.
When asked
specifically for his reflections on “the growth of the IED threat
or
Iranian
influence”, in the context of a wider question on the development
of particular
trends or
any notable events during his tenure, ACM Torpy wrote:
“During my
time as CJO we saw a gradual, although not dramatic rise in
the
number of
IED/EFP attacks against UK troops. Considerable effort was directed
at
developing
tactics, techniques and procedures to mitigate the threat … whilst
at the
same time
seeking improvements to equipment, particularly the introduction of
new
electronic
warfare equipment, additional vehicle armour and better body armour
for
personnel.
Additional intelligence effort was also directed against IED/EFP
networks
to enable
disruption operations to be undertaken.”330
327
Public
hearing, 26 July 2010, page 27.
328
Public
hearing, 26 July 2010, page 31.
329
Public
hearing, 1 February 2010, page 71.
330
Statement,
14 June 2010, page 7.
107