The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
79.
The
Assessments Staff Intelligence Update on 26 November stated that
intelligence
indicated
Saddam Hussein was personally handling all dealings with UNMOVIC;
and he
was
confident the inspectors would not find anything, nor find grounds
for claiming Iraq
had
obstructed its work.25
80.
The Update was
summarising intelligence from a reliable source quoting
Saddam
Hussein’s
own views second hand. The intelligence reported that Saddam
Hussein had
made clear
UNMOVIC was to be given no grounds for claiming that inspections
were
being
obstructed; not that he was confident that the inspectors would not
find grounds
for
claiming that they were being obstructed.
81.
An Assessments
Staff Intelligence Update on 3 December summarised
recent
reporting
which suggested that Iraqi personnel were observing the
inspectors,
that
officials had been instructed on how to handle the inspection
teams, and that
questioning
overseas was forbidden.26
82.
The Update
also reported that:
•
Iraq was
afraid that inspectors would destroy weapons and materials which
were
not
proscribed but had been acquired by procurement activities in
contravention
of
resolution 687 (1991).
•
There was
reporting indicating that Iraq believed inspectors would not
detect
modifications
to extend missile ranges.
83.
Dr Hans Blix,
the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, gave an informal
briefing
to the
Security Council on 25 November, reporting on his visit to Baghdad
from
18 to 19 November
with Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the
IAEA.27
Dr Blix
told the Council that they had been assured Iraq intended to
provide full
co‑operation.
84.
Dr Blix
reported that he had told Iraq that “many governments believed
that
WMD
programmes remained in Iraq”; and that “The Council had wanted to
offer Iraq
a last
opportunity. If the Iraqi side were to state – as it still did at
our meeting – that
there were
no such programmes, it would need to provide convincing
documentary
or other
evidence.” The FFCDs (Full, Final, and Complete Declarations)
submitted
by Iraq to
UNSCOM had, “in many cases left it an open question whether
some
weapons remained”.
25
Minute
[Assessments Staff Intelligence Update], 26 November 2002, ‘Iraq –
26 November 2002’.
26
Minute
[Assessments Staff Intelligence Update], 3 December 2002, ‘Iraq: 3
December 2002’.
27
UNMOVIC,
Briefing of
the Security Council on 25 November 2002, Executive Chairman’s
visit
to Baghdad.
306