The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
laid down
in resolution 1441 and previous relevant resolutions, was sent to
Dr Rice
616.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that:
•
Mr Hoon
had “said he would be happier with a clearer green light from the
AG”.
•
Mr Blair
had been “really irritated” when Sir Andrew Turnbull had “said he
would
need
something to put round the Civil Service that what they were
engaged in
was legal”.
Mr Blair was “clear we would do nothing that wasn’t
legal”.
•
Lord
Goldsmith had provided “a version of the arguments he had put to
TB,
on the
one hand, on the other, reasonable case”.
•
Mr Hoon
had advised that the response to the “US request for the use of
Diego
Garcia and
[RAF] Fairford” should be that it was “not … automatic but had to
go
round the
system”. Mr Blair had said he “did not want to send a signal
that we
would not
do it”.
•
Mr Hoon
and Mr Straw were telling Mr Blair that the US could act
as early as
that
weekend, and “some of our forces would have to be in
before”.248
617.
Mr Straw
advised Mr Blair that the UK and US should not push the
second
resolution
to a vote if it could not secure nine votes and be certain of
avoiding
any vetoes.
618.
Mr Straw
suggested the UK should adopt a “strategy” based on
the
argument
that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by
resolution
1441, and
that the last three meetings of the Security Council met the
requirement
for
Security Council consideration of reports of
non-compliance.
619.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair on 11 March setting out his firm conclusion
that:
“If we
cannot gain nine votes and
be sure of
no veto, we should not push our
second
resolution to a vote. The political and diplomatic consequences for
the UK
would be
significantly worse to have our … resolution defeated (even by just
a
French veto
alone) than if we camp on 1441. [UN Secretary-General] Kofi
Annan’s
comments
last evening have strengthened my already strong view on this.
Getting
Parliamentary
approval for UK military action will be difficult if there is no
second
resolution:
but in my view marginally easier by the strategy I
propose.”249
247
Letter
Manning to Rice, 18 March 2003, [untitled].
248
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
249
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: What if We Cannot
Win the Second Resolution?’.
112