3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
919.
On 4 March,
Sir David Manning and Dr Rice discussed progress in
securing
support for
the resolution, including the desire of some members of the
Security Council
for clear
evidence of Saddam’s failure to comply to justify a vote for a
second resolution
and
possible amendments.286
Sir David
said that “interviews were a litmus test of
Saddam’s
intentions”; UNMOVIC “would be having no difficulties … if Saddam
had
nothing to
hide”. He also suggested pre-empting the argument that
Dr Blix’s “clusters”
document
might provide the benchmark needed for full Iraqi disarmament:
“Instead
we should
emphasise that Blix was producing a list … of all the disarmament
tasks that
Saddam had
failed to undertake …”
920.
Sir David told
Dr Rice that the vote on the resolution should not take place
until
“we knew we
could get nine votes”.
921.
Mr Straw
told the Foreign Affairs Committee on 4 March that it was
“a matter
of fact”
that Iraq had been in material breach “for some weeks” and
resolution
1441
provided sufficient legal authority to justify military action
against Iraq if it
was “in
further material breach”. He emphasised Iraq’s attempts to conceal
its
capabilities
and deceive the inspectors.
922.
Mr Straw
also stated that a majority of members of the Security Council
had
been
opposed to the suggestion that resolution 1441 should state
explicitly that
military
action could be taken only if there were a second
resolution.
923.
Mr Straw
gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 4
March.287
924.
In an opening
statement setting out the UK Government’s position on Iraq’s
failure
to comply
with resolution 1441, Mr Straw said that Saddam Hussein’s
tactics had been:
“… to deny
the existence of weapons of mass destruction and, if caught out,
to
offer the
smallest concession possible in order to work for delay … We can
expect
more
concessions right up to the point at which Saddam Hussein concludes
that
the
international community has, once again, been lured into doing
exactly what
he wants.
Then the concessions will stop, and Saddam Hussein will be left
in
possession
of an arsenal of deadly weapons.”
925.
Mr Straw
stated that it was assessed that Iraq had the capability to
produce
a range
of chemical and biological agents and:
“The Iraqi
regime has put up an elaborate screen of concealment based
on
intimidation
and deception to cover this capability … [W]e know that
sensitive
materials
and documents have been hidden in the homes of employees
and
hidden too
in hospitals, farms and other sites. Intelligence also suggests
that
WMD‑related
items may have been buried and others were being kept on
the
move every
12 hours using trucks and trains. Throughout the period
of inspection
286
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
287
Minutes,
Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), 4 March 2003,
[Evidence Session].
347