The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry:
“… the
decision by the UN to withdraw from Iraq which they took around
about the
middle of
September after a security review, I think … was regrettable, and
it meant
for several
months they were not really playing any sort of role in Iraq. It
also meant
when
Lakhdar Brahimi [the UN’s Special Envoy to Iraq] arrived, initially
in the end of
January
2004 and then again in April 2004, he was really working on his
own.”256
286.
By early
September 2003, the concept of “Iraqiisation” had started being
used in
Whitehall
(see Section 9.2). The term “Iraqiisation” did not have a common or
precise
definition,
but was generally used to mean the ability of the ISF to maintain
security
independently,
rather than under the leadership of the international
forces.
287.
On 2
September, Mr Blair held a meeting of Ministers and senior
personnel.257
They
included Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Mr Hilary Benn (the
International Development
Secretary),
Gen Walker, Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of the Secret
Intelligence Service),
Mr John
Scarlett (Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee), Sir Jeremy
Greenstock (the
Prime
Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq from September),
Mr Sawers
(from
August the
FCO Director General for Political Affairs) and No.10
officials.
288.
The account of
the meeting stated that “the Prime Minister wanted action
on
Iraq taken
forward with a heightened sense of urgency” ahead of a planned
telephone
conversation
with President Bush to review progress. In relation to internal
security, the
record
stated:
“The Prime
Minister believes that the key to the security situation in Iraq is
the rapid
mobilisation
of an effective Iraqi police force. This should
include:
•
Police
manpower up to 70,000 within three months, as a stage towards a
full
force;
•
Adequate
trainers and secure training facilities;
•
Flexible
handling of de‑Ba’athification in order not to exclude
recruits
unnecessarily;
•
Establishment
of an internal intelligence service;
•
Mobilisation
of the Protection Force and Civil Defence Force to protect
key
installations.”
289.
The IPU was
asked to provide a paper setting out further advice after
consulting
DFID, the
MOD, the FCO and the Home Office, which it did on 3
September.258
256
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, page 43.
257
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 2 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for the Prime
Minister’.
258
Paper IPU,
3 September 2003, ‘Iraq Security Plan’.
122