The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

577.  Dr Allawi suggested that the Petraeus Plan could be accelerated by more training

for the ISF command structure and more recruitment of untainted figures from the old

army.

578.  On 23 December, No. 10 reported that Mr Blair was “encouraged that Allawi is now

working on a security strategy which he intends to publish”.523

579.  On 3 January 2005, Prime Minister Allawi wrote to Mr Blair, enclosing an updated

draft of the security plan.524 He had also sent the paper to President Bush that day and

shared the covering letter with Mr Blair. The letter to President Bush highlighted the

mounting security challenges facing Iraq, the lack of resources and the importance of

accelerating the recruitment, training and deployment of Iraqi forces.

580.  The paper was six pages long and briefly outlined the problems with the ISF and

potential solutions. The solutions included: merging the ING with the Iraqi Army to fill

gaps caused by current depletions; a rapid extension of forces; additional training;

and giving the army responsibility for border security. It stated that a request would be

made to the IMF and World Bank to cover a “$1.9bn (or officially $2.25bn)” shortfall in

year one.

581.  On 6 January, Mr Martin Howard, MOD Director General Operational Policy, sent

a draft note about the Strategy to Ms Margaret Aldred, Deputy Head OD Sec, Cabinet

Office.525 Mr Howard wrote that the letter was to go to Mr Nick Beadle, Coalition Senior

Adviser to the IMOD, and Mr Charles Heatly, Adviser to Prime Minister Allawi in Baghdad

and reflected what he and Ms Aldred had agreed the previous day. The note was broadly

supportive of the Strategy but observed that the US could be sensitive to some of the

content, including references to the slow pace of army training (“as a criticism of the

Petraeus Plan”) and to recruiting members of the former Iraqi armed forces.

582.  The draft note stated that reference to “coalition embedded troops” should be

removed from the Strategy document because it had not yet been endorsed in London

and said “it would be better from Allawi’s perspective to minimise any impression that the

Iraqi security forces will remain over‑dependent on the coalition”.

583.  The National Security Strategy was eventually issued on 15 January 2005.526 In it,

Dr Allawi was reported to have amended the goal of training 100,000 Iraqi soldiers by

July to 150,000 “fully qualified” soldiers by the end of the year.

523  Letter Quarrey to Owen, 23 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq: Follow‑up’.

524  Letter Allawi to Blair, 3 January 2005, [untitled] attaching Paper, ‘Iraqi Security Forces – Revised

Recruitment and Training Strategy: 2005’.

525  Letter Howard to Aldred, 6 January 2005, ‘Iraqi National Security Strategy’.

526  New York Times, 24 February 2005, Iraqi Army Is About to Add National Guard to Its Ranks.

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