9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
US
Ambassador to Iraq, remained “circumspect” on the timing of
PIC.52
They
considered
that there
remained “significant problems” associated with “unstable politics”
and “JAM
infiltration”
in Basra.
In Basra
City, occupation of the Basra Palace base was crucial to UK
understanding
of what was
happening and the consequent risks (known in military terminology
as
“situational
awareness”). Centrally located, the Palace site was large enough to
house
both
military and civilian staff, giving them access to Iraqi officials
within the city.
The Palace
was also a target. By summer 2007, it was considered the “most
heavily
mortared
and rocketed place in Iraq”,53
with the
result that civilian staff were relocated to
the more
secure Basra Air Station on the edge of the city in the
autumn.
The ‘in
principle’ decision to re-posture/draw down UK forces in Basra,
subject to a further
review, was
taken by DOP on 14 February 2007. Based on the minutes of that
meeting,
those
present were entitled to assume that a further collective
discussion would take place
before the
decision made in principle was implemented.
Before the
decision was taken, the issue had been discussed once at DOP, and
at its
Sub‑Committee
on Iraq.
The broad
timing of the withdrawal of UK forces from Basra Palace was
subsequently
decided by
Mr Brown without discussion at the Ministerial Committee on
National Security,
International
Relations and Development (NSID), the relevant Cabinet committee
during
his time in
office. The timing was influenced by UK negotiations with JAM1 in
Basra, which
could have
been discussed by NSID in a restricted session, if
necessary.
The risks
of withdrawing from the Palace to the UK’s ability to discharge its
obligations in
Basra were
clearly understood by the MOD and the FCO.
Mr Brown
was advised by Mr Simon McDonald (his Foreign Policy Adviser)
that the
withdrawal
from Basra Palace would result in the loss of situational awareness
and
compromise
the UK’s ability to discharge its responsibility to help the
Government of Iraq
provide
security.
Leaving
Basra Palace was a significant step towards the eventual withdrawal
of UK forces
from Iraq,
and it carried risks to the UK’s reputation. Although
responsibility for the fine
detail
rested with operational commanders, the importance of the decision
on broad timing
was
demonstrated by the Prime Minister’s involvement. For these
reasons, the decision to
withdraw
troops should have been formally considered by a group of senior
Ministers.
157.
As they
reached the end of their respective tours of duty, both Major
General
Jonathan
Shaw, General Officer Commanding MND(SE) from January to August
2007,
and
Lieutenant General William Rollo, Senior British Military
Representative – Iraq
from July
2007 to March 2008, identified the impact of limited resources on
the UK’s
military
effort and questioned the drive for continued drawdown in Iraq in
order to
52
Minute Kyd
to PS/SofS [MOD], 5 July 2007, ‘CDS visit to Iraq 1-3 Jul
07’.
53
Paper FCO
and MOD, 12 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Transition in Basra’.
497