6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
400.
On 17
February, the inter-departmental Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), based in
the
FCO, sent
Mr Ehrman a paper on sectorisation as part of his briefing for a
meeting on
post-conflict
issues, including sectorisation, chaired by Lt Gen
Pigott.139
The
paper,
not yet
agreed with the MOD, recommended that the UK should make clear to
the US
that it was
unwilling to take responsibility for a sector for more than 60 days
unless
its
presence was authorised by the UN and there was to be an early move
to a UN
transitional
administration. The paper is described in Section 6.5.
401.
The IPU
paper’s broad assumption in favour of administration of a small
sector
for a short
period was reflected in the guidance for UK officials attending the
US
inter- agency
Rock Drill on post-conflict issues on 21-22
February.140
402.
On 19
February, the Chiefs of Staff discussed post-conflict planning in
the context
of the
forthcoming Rock Drill.141
403.
Before the
meeting, MOD officials recommended that the Chiefs of Staff agree
a
set of
assumptions about “the scale, posture and duration” of
post-conflict UK military
operations
in order to inform IPU preparations for the Rock
Drill.142
404.
Officials
recommended that the Chiefs of Staff:
“a.
Agree
the
assumption that our aim should be to reduce to a medium
scale
post- conflict
TELIC143
commitment
as soon as possible and pursue discussions
with the US
and potential Coalition allies (to determine our AOR and
burden
sharing)
that will facilitate this.
b.
Note
that
without a UN mandate for occupation (not necessarily the same
thing
as a second
UNSCR) finding Coalition partners will be more difficult and
that
the UK may
face an enduring commitment that will be difficult to sustain
and
damaging to
the long-term health of the Armed Forces.
c.
Agree
that in
discussions with the US, the scale and nature of UK
involvement
is made
conditional on satisfactory UN involvement.
d.
Agree
the
assumption that the UK will administer a sector of Iraq; within
the
constraint
imposed by the maximum level of commitment being medium
scale;
this would
correspond to the UK’s initial
AO,
not
one of the
somewhat larger
sectors
currently being considered in US planning.
139
Minute Iraq
Planning Unit [junior official] to Ehrman, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
General Pigott’s Meeting:
Sectorisation
and UN Involvement’ attaching Paper [unattributed and undated], ‘A
UK Geographical Sector
of
Iraq?’.
140
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day-After (Phase IV)’ attaching
Paper
[unattributed and undated], ‘Iraq Day After: Guidance for Officials
at US ROCK Drill’.
141
Minutes, 19
February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
142
Minute
Chorley to COSSEC, February 2003, ‘Iraq Aftermath – Medium to Long
Term UK Military
Commitment’.
143
Operation
TELIC was the name given to the UK’s military operation in
Iraq.
445