4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
677.
Sir John added
that, after the publication of the Butler Report in July 2004,
“all
front pages
of the Assessments [ie the page with the Key Judgements] have
contained
a box on
the intelligence base” which “spells out the strengths and
weaknesses of
the
intelligence”. That allowed the Key Judgements to be made while
flagging up
the caveats.
678.
Asked if he
had expressed any concerns during the drafting of the dossier,
for
instance
about caveats being dropped or because the text becoming more
definite than
a normal
JIC report might have been, Sir Richard Dearlove
replied:
“… with the
benefit of hindsight, I was happy with what the dossier said in
terms
of what
we believed at the time that it was written.”367
679.
In the context
of a reference to comment in the Butler Report that the
language
of the
dossier may have left readers with the impression that there was
fuller and firmer
intelligence
behind the judgements in the dossier than was the case, Sir Richard
added:
“Yes, I
know it said that, but I think it is easy to write these things
afterwards. I mean,
you know,
at the time when that dossier was published, it’s what we believed
on the
evidence
available, partly historical – significantly historical – partly
based on the
sources,
[…]
…
“… I had
been worried about the dossier for a very long time because I
didn’t feel
that we had
a very substantive picture from intelligence. We had a
substantive
picture
from historical material.
“By the
time, you know, the draft was complete, I was, I think, surprised
how much
material
had been assembled. I think you have to recall, when this document
was
published
-- and I would actually refer you also to the Institute of
Strategic Studies
document.
Both were felt to be rather conservative, rather reserved pictures
of what
Iraq’s
capability was at that time. You know, it’s only now – and I’m also
firmly of the
view that
we still don’t have a complete picture of Iraq’s WMD
…”368
680.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s position on the very restricted circulation of the SIS
reports
of 11 and
23 September is set out earlier in this Section.
681.
In its
report, Iraqi Weapons
of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessment,
published
in September 2003, the ISC examined “whether the available
intelligence,
367
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, page 57.
368
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 57-58.
245