The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
45.
The adoption
on 29 November 2001 of resolution 1382 went some way towards
that
objective.
But support for economic sanctions was eroding and whether Iraq
would ever
agree to
re-admit weapons inspectors and allow them to operate without
obstruction was
in
doubt.
46.
Although there
was no evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaida,
Mr Blair
encouraged
President Bush to address the issue of Iraq in the context of a
wider
strategy to
confront terrorism after the attacks of 9/11. He sought to prevent
precipitate
military
action by the US which he considered would undermine the success of
the
coalition
which had been established for action against international
terrorism.
47.
President
Bush’s remarks16
on
26 November renewed UK concerns that US
attention
was turning towards military action in Iraq.
48.
Following a
discussion with President Bush on 3 December, Mr Blair
sent him
a paper
on a second phase of the war against terrorism.17
49.
On Iraq,
Mr Blair suggested a strategy for regime change in Iraq. This
would build
over time
until the point was reached where “military action could be taken
if necessary”,
without
losing international support.
50.
The strategy
was based on the premise that Iraq was a threat which had to be
dealt
with and it
had multiple diplomatic strands. It entailed renewed demands for
Iraq to
comply with
the obligations imposed by the Security Council and for the
re-admission
of weapons
inspectors, and a readiness to respond firmly if Saddam Hussein
failed
to comply.
51.
Mr Blair
did not, at that stage, have a ground invasion of Iraq or immediate
military
action of
any sort in mind. The strategy included mounting covert operations
in support
of those
“with the ability to topple Saddam”. But Mr Blair did state
that, when a rebellion
occurred,
the US and UK should “back it militarily”.
52.
That was the
first step towards a policy of possible intervention in
Iraq.
53.
A number of
issues, including the legal basis for any military action, would
need
to be
resolved as part of developing the strategy.
54.
The UK
Government does not appear to have had any knowledge at that stage
that
President
Bush had asked General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief, US
Central
Command, to
review the military options for removing Saddam Hussein,
including
options for
a conventional ground invasion.
55.
Mr Blair
also emphasised the threat which Iraq might pose in the future.
That
remained a
key part of his position in the months that followed.
16
The White
House, 26 November 2001, The
President Welcomes Aid Workers Rescued from
Afghanistan.
17
Paper
[Blair to Bush], 4 December 2001, ‘The War against Terrorism:
The Second Phase’.
578